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1. Abstract 
This thesis seeks to identify the most important factors that contributed to the breakdown of 
the gold standard in the 1930s, and to see if these factors are present in the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) today. This is done in order to find out if the same factors might 
create, or have created, similar instabilities and problems in the EMU as they imposed on the 
interwar gold standard.  
The factors regarded as important for the breakdown of the gold standard are (1) the central 
bank´s interest rate policy and the rules of the game, (2) imbalances in exchange rates and 
(3) debt levels, (4) the systems ability to handle fundamental changes, and the (5) credibility 
of the monetary union.   
Comparative methods have been used in order to find out if the factors are present in both 
monetary unions. The countries to be analysed are in opposite positions within each union. 
This is done in order to highlight the differences and instabilities.  
The conclusions from the discussion are that there are similarities between the gold standard 
and the EMU for all the five factors, and that they do impose instabilities also in the EMU.  
Gold standard members interrupted gold flows as they failed to follow the rules of the game 
in their interest rate decisions, while the EMU countries are unable to affect the capital flows 
in the same manner because of their common interest rate. Differences in inflation and 
economic development have caused the real exchange rates to diverge between countries, 
affecting competitiveness and international trade. Also very high debt levels in some 
countries have imposed problems in both monetary unions. But the origin of the debt and the 
degree of future government obligations increase the severity of the debt levels in the EMU 
compared to the gold standard.  
Rigidities in wage and price levels impede the adjustment mechanisms within both unions. 
This has extended the adjustment periods and made them relatively harder for the economic 
activity as more pressure is put on output and employment in order to adjust. The lack of 
cooperation and political integration has also reduced credibility in both monetary unions.  
It is likely that these factors will continue to create problems within the EMU in the future, 
but it is difficult to predict if they are going to cause the breakdown of the monetary union.  
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Compared to the gold standard, the EMU is already a more politically integrated monetary 
union with free trade and labour agreements and a common independent central bank. This 
could have made the EMU more resistant to the factors compared with the gold standard, but 
the efforts seem to be inadequate.  
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2. Introduction 
2.1 Problem 
Comparisons between the gold standard and the European Monetary Union (EMU) have 
appeared more frequently in the media since the outbreak of the European Sovereign Debt 
crisis in late 20091. It has been claimed that the burdens are unevenly divided between 
countries and that some of the problems seen in the EMU are similar to those that prevailed 
under the gold standard in the 1920s.  
I want to find out whether there is any truth behind these accusations. Could the instabilities 
that contributed to the breakdown of the gold standard also impose similar problems for the 
monetary union in Europe? This assignment compares the most important factors for the 
collapse of the gold standard with the EMU. This will not necessarily cover all possible 
problems with the EMU, but rather discover similar instabilities and problems prevailing 
within two similar monetary unions.   
The problem summarised; 
“Which political and economical factors were important contributors to the breakdown of 
the gold standard in the 1930s? Are any of these factors present in the European Monetary 
Union today, and if so, is it likely that they will contribute to similar lasting instabilities and 
a possible breakdown of the euro in the future?” 
 
2.2 Restrictions 
The interwar period is chosen as the relevant period for the gold standard in this assignment. 
1925 is often taken as the reestablishment of the international system after the World War I 
(WWI), while its demise is usually dated to the sterling´s devaluation in the autumn of 
                                                
1 (Rogoff, 2012) 
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19312. It is argued that instabilities were more evident during the interwar gold standard than 
during the classical era of the standard. This was also the period leading to the breakdown, 
making it a more relevant period for this analysis.  
The Great Depression that started in 1929 also imposed huge implications for the gold 
standard, as the Financial Crisis in 2008-2009 and the Sovereign Debt Crisis of late 2009 
have done for the EMU. I will not focus on the crisis themselves, but rather the ability for 
the monetary system to handle situations that arise from asymmetric shocks like that.  
There were several reasons for the breakdown of the gold standard in 1931, but some 
imbalances and political decisions might have been more damaging than others. The five 
factors that I have regarded as the most important, based on relevant literature, are; (1) the 
central bank´s interest rate policy and the rules of the game, (2) imbalances in exchange rates 
and (3) debt levels, (4) the systems ability to handle fundamental changes, and the (5) 
credibility of the monetary union.   
For both monetary unions I have selected a couple of countries that are in opposite 
situations, as deficit and surplus countries. This is done to highlight the different impacts the 
problems have had on countries in different positions, and to look at the imbalances between 
countries within the same monetary system.  
For the gold standard I will focus on the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, United States 
(US) and France. For the EMU the focus is on Germany, France and the PIIGS countries, i.e. 
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain.   
 
2.3 Outline  
The first part is devoted to different economic theories relevant for later discussions and 
analysis. Part two is a historical and theoretical presentation of the two monetary systems, 
the gold standard and the EMU.  
                                                
2 (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, 1992, p. 187) 
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Part three contains the analysis and discussion of each of the five factors mentioned under 
the restrictions, first discussed for the gold standard and then for the EMU. Each factor will 
end with a comparison of the two monetary systems based on relevant data, figures and 
theories.  
 13 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Method 
I have used available literature as a source of information. A “systematic review” of the 
literature about each of the two monetary systems and their theoretical frameworks is done. I 
have also done “a critical review of the knowledge from the sources”3.   
I have used comparative method for the comparisons and analysis. To compare means to 
describe variables, and descriptive comparisons focus on “the degree of similarity and 
difference between two or more cases4 ”.  Comparative method can be defined as “a set of 
logically based procedures for systematically testing against empirical evidence alternative 
(or competing) hypotheses about causal connections between phenomena, and thereby either 
corroborate or reject them5 ”.  
As several smaller topics are being analysed in this thesis, the analysis is divided into 
smaller comparisons that might differ in form and data material used. Some of them are 
based on relative numbers while others are based on non-numerical political and monetary 
factors.  
 
3.2 Collection of data 
There are huge amounts of available literature about the gold standard, but relevant data 
proved to be somewhat harder to find. Most of the data is collected from statistical and 
historical books. Some data have also been collected from figures and graphs, causing some 
small approximations. This is mentioned for the relevant figures.  
                                                
3 (Blanghammer, 2003) 
4 (Caramani, 2008, p. 3) 
5 (Caramani, 2008, p. 3) 
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Data for the EMU countries are mainly collected from the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) database and from the European Commission, but some 
figures are also found in other people’s research articles. As there are daily developments in 
the current EMU crisis, some information is collected from recent articles and newspapers.  
 
3.3 Reliability 
Reliability is a basic fundament within all research. Reliability is relied to the data in the 
study, which data that is used, the way that they are collected and how they are evaluated 6. 
All the information I have used is collected from reliable books and data sources. One factor 
that could impair the reliability of some of the information is current news articles that might 
be coloured by the author’s personal beliefs or political agenda, especially when it comes to 
the EMU.  
 
3.4 Validity  
Validity is an expression for the relevance of the data material 7. It expresses to which extent 
the collected information is relevant for the assignment´s problem. The information that is 
used as a foundation for the discussion part is limited to answering the assignments problem. 
Therefore I assume the data material as relevant.  
 
 
                                                
6 (Halvorsen, 2003) 
7 (Halvorsen, 2003) 
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4. Part I - Theory 
4.1 What is money? 
One way of defining money is as Sir John Hicks said it; “Money is what money does8 ”. 
With this he said that money can be defined by its functions; anything is money which is 
used as money9.  
It has been argued that a medium of exchange will arise even in an economy that starts with 
barter. If one commodity is traded a lot, for example onions, people that trade with relatively 
rare commodities can increase the chance of finding an exact match by doing an intermediate 
trade in onions. Then they can do another trade in the commodity of their choice with these 
onions. Once these people begin to trade in onions, the probability of finding someone to 
accept onions in trade increases. This induces more people to trade with onions. If this 
process continues will the majority of trades eventually involve onions and onions will 
become the medium of exchange or vehicle currency.10 
If the chosen item is difficult to carry around there is an incentive for individuals to accept 
onions and issue paper claims against them. There are historical parallels here.  Gold was 
also accepted as a medium of exchange but could be impractical to carry around. This gave 
banks incentives to accept gold and issue banknotes against it, a role later taken over by 
central banks.11  
Acceptability is the essence of the issue. Each person accepts payment in money only 
because he or she expects others to accept it in payment from him or her. We value money 
only because we know that others do and everybody is in the same position.  
More specific we can say that money serve three functions in the economy;  
                                                
8 (Hicks, 1967) 
9 (Hicks, 1967) 
10 (Jones, 1976) 
11 (MacDonald & Milbourne, 1990) 
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i. a	  measure	  of	  value	  ii. a	  means	  of	  exchange	  or	  payment	  iii. a	  liquid	  store	  of	  value12	  	  	  
Money is a measure of value, and makes it possible to express and compare the values of 
different goods and services. Just as it is convenient to adopt common measures of length 
and weight, it is also convenient to adopt a common language in which to express value. 
As a means of exchange, money acts as a timesaver by enabling people to sell to one person 
and buy from another, or to sell in one place and buy in another. The wider geographical 
area accepting money as a mean of payment, the greater is the saving.  
Money is a store of value, and cash is generally the most liquid of all assets by virtue of its 
medium of exchange function. Many people over a large geographical area immediately 
accept cash in payment.13  
 
4.2 Fixed exchange rates 
The exchange rate is merely the relative price of two currencies, and each country´s currency 
is monopolistically supplied by its central bank.  
In a system with floating exchange rates, the exchange rates between two currencies are 
determined by the demand and supply of the currencies in the free market. In a fixed 
exchange rate system the government announces the buying and selling rates for its currency 
in terms of a foreign currency. It then promises to trade in unlimited amounts at that rate in 
order to keep the exchange rate fixed.14  
                                                
12 (Lewis & Mizen, 2000, p. 5) 
13 (Lewis & Mizen, 2000, pp. 9-10) 
14 (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 1995) 
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Monetary policy consists of the measures that affect the interest rate and supply of money 
and credit in an economy. Fiscal policy consists of measures related to central and local 
government revenue and expenditure.15 Under a fixed exchange rate, the domestic nominal 
interest rate must equal the foreign nominal interest rate. This implies that interest rates are 
determined abroad and not by domestic monetary policy. The government therefore loses 
control over the domestic money supply when they have a fixed exchange rate.16 Fiscal 
policies are not necessarily tied in the same manner due to a fixed exchange rate.   
 
4.2.1 Why fixed exchange rate? 
There are three main reasons for fixing a country´s exchange rate. First, the unexpected 
volatility from a floating exchange rate can be very damaging, both over short and long term. 
The uncertainty around the exchange rates might reduce international trade and discourage 
investment. Workers and firms might hurt by long-term exchange rate swings, and they often 
demand import protection from their government.  
The second major rationale for fixed exchange rates is an argument for governments. This 
stems from a belief that pegging to a low-inflation currency will help to restrain domestic 
inflation pressure. The basic idea is that an announced policy of pegging the exchange rate 
may serve as a commitment technology preventing the government from following 
excessively expansionary macroeconomic policies.  
A third reason for pegging applies to countries deflating after periods of price-level 
instability. For countries in this situation, the fixed rates can have the attraction of anchoring 
price inflation for internationally traded goods. This might provide a guide for private-sector 
inflation expectations.17  
                                                
15 (Eshag, 1983, p. 28) 
16 (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 1995) 
17 (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 1995, pp. 76-77) 
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4.2.2 Speculative attacks 
Speculative attacks might become a severe problem for fixed exchange rate regimes. 
Speculators make bets or guesses on where they believe the market is headed regardless if it 
might become destabilising for a monetary system. A currency is monopolistically supplied 
from its central bank, and they will virtually always have the resources to crush speculators. 
The problem is that very few central banks will cling to an exchange rate target without 
regard to what is happening in the rest of the economy. This is because domestic political 
realities will not allow it, even when agreements with foreign governments are at stake.  
The governments must be prepared to allow a sharp increase in domestic interest rates, 
especially in the short term, in order to fight off an attack. If this lasts for a long time, this 
can wreak havoc with the banking system, which typically borrows short and lends long. 
These unanticipated rises in the interest rate can have profound negative effects on 
investment, unemployment, the government budget deficit and the domestic distribution of 
income over the long run. A government pledge that it will ignore such side effects 
indefinitely to defend the exchange rate is not likely to be credible. Lack of credibility, in 
turn, makes a fixed exchange rate more vulnerable to speculative attack. Since it is so costly, 
the goal for the governments is to convince speculators as quickly as possible that it is not 
going to fold, so that interest rates can return to normal levels.18  
 
4.3 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
The real exchange rate can be defined as the nominal exchange rate plus inflation 
differentials among different countries. It is often used as an indicator of competitiveness in 
the foreign trade of a country. The idea of the PPP theory is that monies of different 
countries, when measured in the same units, should be able to buy the same basket of goods. 
                                                
18 (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 1995, pp. 78-80) 
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If this is not the case, international arbitrage should bring about adjustment in prices, 
exchange rates, or both, which ultimately will restore parity.19  
According to the PPP theory, the real exchange rate (R) can be defined in the long run as 
follows:  
 R = !"∗!  
S is the nominal exchange rate that is adjusted by the ratio of the foreign price level (P*) to 
the domestic price level (P).  
A depreciation of the real exchange rate would make the economy more competitive. This 
would stimulate export and discourage imports. This, in turn tends to improve the current 
account of the balance of payments (BOP).20 An appreciation of the real exchange rate 
would on the other hand encourage imports and reduce the current account balance.  
 
4.4 The (n-1) problem and credibility 
In a system of n countries there are only (n – 1) independent exchange rates. In the case of 
two countries, they would only have one exchange rate to care about. Therefore only (n – 1) 
countries have to use their monetary policies to maintain all the exchange rates fixed. This 
implies that the system would have one degree of freedom; one monetary authority is free to 
set its monetary policy independently from the exchange rate constraint.  
There is one good and one bad news concerning the degree of freedom, the good being that 
this gives the countries in the system the ability to pursue some joint objective. This could be 
to stimulate the economy, reduce inflation etc. The bad news is that this degree of freedom is 
likely to be a source of conflict between the members of the system.  
                                                
19 (Diebold, Husted, & Rush, 1991) 
20 (Grauwe, International Money - Postwar Trends and Theories, 1996, p. 49) 
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A simple two-country model of the money markets can illustrate this. It is assumed that there 
are traditional monetary demand functions in the two countries called A and B. The money 
supply is given by MA and MB. Equilibrium in the money market implies that the demand for 
money equals the supply of money in both countries. Analytically, this gives: 
PA LA ( YA , rA ) = MA 
and 
PB LB ( YB , rB ) = MB 
PA and PB is the price level in country A and B; LA and LB are the liquidity preference 
functions; YA and YB are the levels of real income; and rA and rB are the levels of the 
nominal interest rates in the countries. Real income has a positive effect on the money 
demand, while the interest rate has a negative effect.  
We assume that the money markets of the two countries are linked together by freely mobile 
capital. That is; there is full convertibility of the two currencies, both for current and capital 
account transactions. Then the “open” interest parity can be used, given by: 
rA = rB + µ 
µ is the expected rate of devaluation of the currency of country A, in other words, the 
revaluation of currency B. The interpretation is that when the currency of country A is 
expected to devalue, µ becomes positive. Consequently, the interest rate of country A has to 
increase relative to the interest rate of country B. This is because the owners will only be 
willing to hold A assets if they are compensated for the expected future decline in the value 
of currency A by a higher interest return on A assets. This tells us that countries with weak 
currencies have a higher interest rate.  
Let us assume that the exchange rate is fixed between the two currencies, and that this 
commitment is credible; µ is zero. As a result, the interest rates will have to be equal in the 
two countries. The interest rate can be seen on the vertical axis and the demand and supply 
of money on the horizontal axis in Figure 1. 21  
                                                
21 (Grauwe, International Money - Postwar Trends and Theories, 1996, pp. 26-29) 
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Figure 1: Exchange Rates and Money Supply 
 
Source: (Grauwe, International Money - Postwar Trends and Theories, 1996, p. 28) 
The money demand function is downward sloping because of the usual assumption that the 
demand for money is negatively related to the interest rate. We can see from the figure that 
there are many levels of interest rates and money levels that will satisfy the fixed exchange 
rate commitment. Both r1 with MA1 and MB1, and r2 with MA2 and MB2 satisfy the same 
exchange rate commitment. 
One can say that the fixed exchange rate commitment is compatible with any level of interest 
rate and money stock. The fundamental problem that follows the (n – 1) problem is then that 
the countries have to agree on the way monetary policies are to be conducted. Problems and 
conflicts will arise when the consensus about the appropriate level of the money stock breaks 
down.22 
The (n-1) problem might become severe for a monetary union as it arises from a conflict 
between the authorities of different countries. Conflicts at this level might undermine the 
stability of the system as a whole.23 
 
                                                
22 (Grauwe, International Money - Postwar Trends and Theories, 1996, pp. 26-29) 
23 (Grauwe, International Money - Postwar Trends and Theories, 1996, pp. 54-55) 
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4.5 The adjustment problem 
The adjustment problem can be limited to one country as it is a conflict between the 
domestic and external objectives of the authorities. One way to present the adjustment 
problem is with a Swan – diagram, presented in Figure 2. The Figure portrays the 
relationship between domestic and external equilibrium in an economy.  
Figure 2: Swan - Diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Grauwe, International Money - Postwar Trends and Theories, 1996, p. 49) 
The vertical axis represents the real exchange rate, R, as explained in section 4.3. On the 
horizontal axis we find the total level of spending in the economy, A, which is often called 
“absorption”. The relation between absorption and output is given by the macroeconomic 
equilibrium condition; 
Y = C + I + G + X – M 
All variables are expressed in real terms. Y is the supply of output, C is private spending, I is 
private investment, G is government spending, X is the level of exports, and M is the level of 
imports. The equation can also be written as: 
Y – A = X – M,  
where  
A = C + I + G 
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Two equilibrium conditions are defined in Figure 2. The DE line stands for domestic 
equilibrium. DE represents the combinations of real exchange rate and absorption for which 
there is domestic equilibrium. Domestic equilibrium is defined here as level of 
unemployment corresponding to the natural rate, which will be explained further in section 
4.8.1. If the level of unemployment is below the natural level, this tends to lead to 
inflationary pressures, while a level above leads to a downward pressure on prices. The DE 
line is declining because if we let the exchange rate increase from the initial domestic 
equilibrium, this tends to increase exports and output. This will in turn reduce the 
unemployment rate below the natural rate, and trigger inflationary pressures.  
The External Equilibrium, EE, represents the combinations of real exchange rate and 
absorption levels for which the current account of the balance of payments is in equilibrium. 
It is upward sloping because when the real exchange rate increase, i.e. competitiveness 
improves, the current account improves. To maintain the current account balance, the level 
of absorption must increase in order to increase imports. Below the EE line, the account 
shows deficit, and above surplus.24  
 
4.5.1 Flexibility 
In a world with price and wage flexibility, there are essentially two mechanisms that will 
make the economy adjust back to equilibrium after a domestic inflationary shock. First, the 
increase in the unemployment level reduces the wage level. This will in turn make it possible 
for the price of domestic output to decline. Following this, the current account deficit forces 
the monetary authorities to intervene in the foreign exchange market and to sell foreign 
currency against the domestic one.25  
The second mechanism is to allow the rules of the game of a fixed exchange system to 
operate, that is to avoid sterilizing balance of payments flows26. These rules state that when 
                                                
24 (Grauwe, International Money - Postwar Trends and Theories, 1996, pp. 49-51) 
25 (Grauwe, International Money - Postwar Trends and Theories, 1996, pp. 51-53) 
26 (Giovannini, 1988). 
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there is an inflationary shock, i.e. that the prices in the economy increases at a faster rate 
than the wage level, the money stock will decline and the domestic interest rates will 
increase as a result. The total effect is deflationary because it reduces absorption and 
decreases the price level. The desired results from these two channels are to improve 
competitiveness, reduce unemployment and improve the current account of the balance of 
payments.27  
 
4.5.2 Rigidity 
But what happens in a world with wage and price rigidity? Wage rigidity can be explained as 
the failure of wages to adjust to a level at which labour supply equals labour demand28. The 
similar explanation holds for price rigidity, which is the failure of prices to move to clear the 
market.  
 If there is complete rigidity in both wage and price levels, nothing will push the real 
exchange rate upwards if a shock sends the economy to point C in Figure 3. The exchange 
rate is fixed, the domestic price level is rigid and the foreign price level is exogenous. At the 
heart of the dilemma is the choice between pursuing a domestic or external equilibrium.29  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
27 (Grauwe, International Money - Postwar Trends and Theories, 1996, pp. 51-53) 
28 (Mankiw & Taylor, 2008, p. 177) 
29 (Grauwe, International Money - Postwar Trends and Theories, 1996, pp. 51-53) 
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Figure 3: Swan – Diagram With Wage and Price Rigidity  
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Grauwe, International Money - Postwar Trends and Theories, 1996, p. 51) 
In order to pursue a domestic equilibrium, the authorities will need to stimulate the economy 
by more spending or less taxation. Absorption will increase and move the economy back 
towards the domestic equilibrium, but at the price of an accumulated unsustainable current 
account deficit. The deficit is unsustainable because a continuous deficit implies a 
continuous declining stock of international reserves. These reserves are finite, so at one point 
the stock will be depleted and the authorities will be unable to intervene in the foreign 
exchange market and might be forced to let the exchange rate increase.  
The external equilibrium can be reached by following the rules of the game, which will 
deflate total spending. The deflationary effect will increase unemployment. This might be an 
unpopular choice and will be perceived as suboptimal by policymakers that care about 
unemployment. Politicians will therefore have an incentive to use the exchange rate and 
devaluate as an additional instrument in order to achieve a better balance between the 
domestic and external equilibrium, and to lift the economy out of its low competitiveness 
trap in point C.   
Because the authorities have to choose between domestic and external equilibrium, the 
commitment to a fixed exchange rate can quickly loose its credibility when the economy is 
trapped on the line through C. Only if it can be assured that the government give no weight 
at all to unemployment is the fixed exchange rate commitment credible.30  
                                                
30 (Grauwe, International Money - Postwar Trends and Theories, 1996, pp. 51-53) 
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The adjustment problem can be limited to one country as it is a conflict between the 
domestic and external objectives of the authorities, and will not necessarily jeopardize the 
whole system31.  
 
4.5.3 Labour mobility 
Labour mobility might increase the credibility of a fixed exchange rate system, and 
compensate for wage rigidity. Mobility would involve emigration of unemployed labour, and 
would enable a country to reach its equilibrium target without increasing unemployment.32 
Labour mobility is important when shocks are permanent and structural, since adjustment 
inevitably requires a reallocation of production factors. Mobility might help accelerate the 
adjustment process and promote a more even distribution of regional incomes, wages and 
unemployment.33  
 
4.6  Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) 
An ideally functioning monetary system permits producers to specialize in goods in which 
the nation has a comparative advantage and savers to search beyond the national borders for 
profitable investment opportunities34.  
The OCA theory weights the benefits of adopting a common currency against the costs of 
abandoning independent monetary policy. Some of the most important benefits from 
monetary integration are reduced transaction and information costs and increased price 
transparency that boosts trade and gives rise to competition. The more integrated the 
countries in the currency union are, the higher are the benefits. The costs however are 
                                                
31 (Grauwe, International Money - Postwar Trends and Theories, 1996, pp. 54-55) 
32 (Grauwe, International Money - Postwar Trends and Theories, 1996, pp. 51-53) 
33 (Coppel, Serres, & Hoeller, 1999, pp. 119-120) 
34 (Eichengreen, The Gold Standard in Theory and History, 1985, p. 1) 
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associated with the fact that monetary policies no longer can effectively accommodate 
diverging cyclical positions across the involved economies.35 
It is important that the benefits exceed the costs for the members in a monetary union. The 
vertical axis in Figure 4a measures the degree of symmetry between regions, meaning 
correlated growth rates and employment among others. Flexibility relates to wage flexibility. 
The central insight of the theory of OCA is that countries or regions that experience a lot of 
asymmetry in output and employment growth need to have much flexibility in their labour 
markets if they want to benefit from the monetary union without having too large adjustment 
problems. The downward slope of the line OCA represents this relationship.  
Figure 4a: OCA and Flexibility   Figure 4b: OCA and Trade Integration 
 
Source: (Grauwe, Economics of Montary Union, 2007, p. 85) 
The cost of a monetary union can be represented in Figure 4b. The symmetry on the vertical 
axis is the same as in the previous figure, while the degree of trade integration between 
groups of countries is measured on the horizontal axis. The TT line is upward sloping 
because the degree of symmetry increases as trade integration increases. Both symmetry and 
trade integration are qualities that increase the benefits of a monetary union. Countries will 
become more alike and therefore experience fewer asymmetric shocks when the level of 
trade integration is high.  
                                                
35 (Economic and Financial Affairs, 2008) 
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The OCA line represents the minimal combinations of symmetry and trade integration that 
equalizes the costs and benefits of a monetary union. The points on the line therefore 
represent combinations of symmetry and integration for which the monetary union has a zero 
net gain. Following this, the points to the right of the OCA line are points for which the 
benefits exceed the costs, the OCA - zone, and the points to the left are points where the 
costs exceed the benefits.36 
 
4.7 Monetary and political union 
It is possible to distinguish between an institutional and a functional dimension when it 
comes to a political union. The institutional level concerns the institutions that govern the 
union. The functional level asks the question about the areas in which the member states 
have transferred their sovereignty to the monetary union.  
It would be possible to centralise a significant part of national budgets in a political 
monetary union. This would make it possible to organise systems of automatic fiscal 
transfers that could provide some insurance against asymmetric shocks. By transferring 
funds from member states with good economic conditions to a member state experiencing an 
asymmetric negative shock, member countries could prevent lasting diverging balances 
within the union.  
A political union would also reduce the risk of asymmetric shocks that have a political 
origin. Taxing and spending could be on the monetary union level instead of in the hands of 
national governments.  
The effects of a monetary union becoming a political union can be seen in Figure 5. The 
centralised budget makes it possible to alleviate the plight of countries hit by a negative 
shock, reducing the cost of the union at any given level. Following this, the OCA shifts 
downwards.  
                                                
36 (Grauwe, Economics of Montary Union, 2007, pp. 85-95) 
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The second effect is that a political union reduces the degree of asymmetry, moving the 
position of the monetary union upwards. These two shifts indicate that political unification 
increases the long-term sustainability of a monetary union.37  
Figure 5: Monetary and Political Union 
 
Source: (Grauwe, Economics of Montary Union, 2007, p. 117) 
 
4.8 The Phillips curve 
The Phillips curve gives us the relationship between wage-price inflation and the level of 
economic activity. It was developed based on an empirical regularity in search of a theory. 
The relationship between the unemployment rate and wage inflation was such that high 
unemployment was associated with low growth of wages, while low unemployment was 
combined with a rapid growth of wages. A stimulus to demand, from for example 
government spending, would increase output and reduce unemployment, but at the cost of 
                                                
37 (Grauwe, Economics of Montary Union, 2007, pp. 113-117) 
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higher inflation. Conversely, a reduction in demand would reduce inflation, but at the cost of 
increased unemployment.38  
Figure 6: The Original Phillips Curve 
 
Source: (Bain & Howells, 2009, p. 154) 
 
4.8.1 Natural rate of unemployment 
The relationship described in the original Phillips curve was later questioned, as new data 
appeared to indicate both rising inflation and lower economic activity. It was suggested that 
this happened because of the process by which wages were negotiated, which determined the 
inflation rate, involved expectations of future conditions. Friedman corrected the 
misspecifications by correcting the model for two inconsistencies. First, he specified the 
relationship in real terms rather than nominal terms. He also augmented it with price 
expectations, enabling the model to predict accurately the change to prices over the period 
for which wages were being negotiated.  
Secondly, he specified the relationship between the level, not the change, of the wage and 
the rate of unemployment. Then there also needed to be a “natural rate of unemployment” to 
which the economy would converge in the absence of disturbances. The natural rate 
represents the long-run level of unemployment consistent with any level of nominal wage 
                                                
38 (Lewis & Mizen, 2000, pp. 215-217) 
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inflation, given that there is no money illusion and that price expectations are correct for 
nominal changes in wages.  
Friedman suggested that there were two reasons for the negative relationship in the original 
Phillips curve. The first reason was temporary money illusion and the second was that there 
was a possibility of being an exploitable trade-off between inflation and unemployment in 
the short run. In the long run, on the other hand, the true changes to the real wage would 
become apparent as nominal prices and wages were observed. Then expectations would 
change and the short run deviation from the natural rate of unemployment would be 
corrected.  
There can be no money illusion in the long run in the expectations augmented version of the 
Phillips curve. The curve is therefore vertical at the natural rate of unemployment, as shown 
in Figure 7. AA is the short run expectation augmented Phillips curve, with the same 
negative relationship between wage inflation and unemployment as in Figure 6. BB 
represents the long-run Phillips curve, which is vertical above the natural rate of 
unemployment, U*.39 
Figure 7: Natural Level of Unemployment 
 
Source: (Lewis & Mizen, 2000, p. 217) 
  
                                                
39 (Lewis & Mizen, 2000, pp. 215-217). 
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4.9 Different forms of risk 
Interest rate differentials on government debt can be explained by looking at the risk 
associated with the issuer of the debt.  Two sources that can explain interest rate differentials 
are liquidity and default risk.  
Liquidity risk is the risk of having to sell or buy a bond in a thin market, and therefore at an 
unfair price and with higher transaction costs. Issuers with low volumes of bonds 
outstanding have a smaller market than large issuers. They therefore have to compensate 
investors with a liquidity premium.40 
Default risk is the possibility that the counterpart in a financial contract will not fulfil its 
contractually stated obligations. If this happens, the party defaults. More generally the term 
credit risk or solvency risk can be used. This is the risk associated with any kind of credit-
linked events, as a change in credit quality, which includes downgrades or upgrades in credit 
ratings. Credit ratings are a measure of the firm or country´s propensity to default.41 
Sovereign issuers that are perceived as having a greater credit risk must pay investors a 
default risk premium42.  
 
 
 
                                                
40 (Favero & Missale, 2011, pp. 5-6) 
41 (Bielecki & Rutkowski, 2004, pp. 1-7) 
42 (Favero & Missale, 2011, pp. 5-6) 
 33 
5. Part II - History and theory of the monetary 
unions 
5.1 The gold standard 
The interwar gold standard will be presented in this section. The first section presents the 
history of the interwar gold standard. This will be followed by an explanation of the 
theoretical framework of the monetary union.  
 
5.1.1 History of the interwar gold standard 
The gold standard can be divided into the classical gold standard and the interwar gold 
standard. The classical gold standard lasted from 1870 and ended in 1914 at the outbreak of 
the WWI. Governments needed money to finance their war expenditures, and in order to 
mobilise resources, the authorities imposed new taxes and issued government bonds. When 
these resources proved inadequate, they suspended the statutes requiring them to back 
currency with gold or foreign exchange. They issued fiat money, which were new money un-
backed by gold, to help them pay their expenses. But different rates of fiat-money creation in 
different countries caused exchange rates to vary widely. Exchange rates began to float when 
the gold market arbitrage disrupted.43  
Inflation levels had been relatively moderate in the US, and gold reserves were abundant. 
The US was the only country that maintained convertibility at the pre-war rate right after the 
end of the war. 44 Great Britain did not join the US back on the gold standard until 1925, but 
by the end of that year nearly 36 countries had also effectively restored convertibility. 1925 
is often taken as the reestablishment of the international monetary system.  
                                                
43 (Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital - A History of the International Monetary System, 1998, p. 46) 
44 (Eichengreen, The Gold Standard in Theory and History, 1985, p. 19) 
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The Wall Street Crash in October 1929 and the following Great Depression did not make 
things easier for the hard pressured monetary union.  Prices declined slowly for several years 
before a larger drop from 1929. Economic activity had already been in decline well before 
this, and countries started to struggle with high unemployment and low domestic demand. 
The demise of the gold standard is usually dated to the devaluation of the sterling in the 
autumn of 1931. Some 50 nations participated in the international gold standard during the 
interwar years.45 
Table 1: Interwar Period on the Gold Standard 
 
Source: (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-
1939, 1992, pp. 188-189)  
The monetary history of the 1920s can be understood as a record of strenuous efforts to 
restore the international gold standard. There was a widespread agreement on the desirability 
of returning to gold. The gold standard had been synonymous with exchange-rate stability 
and balance of payments stability for long periods of time in large parts of the world. But 
even if the interwar gold standard resembled its predecessor, it shared few of its virtues. 46 
 
Not a political union 
The gold standard was a monetary union without any political integration. The rules of the 
game, to be explained in the next section, set the conditions for national monetary policy, but 
no sanctions could be imposed if countries failed to act according to these.  
                                                
45 (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, 1992, p. 187) 
46 (Eichengreen, The Gold Standard in Theory and History, 1985, pp. 19-20) 
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The role of leadership was not as clear during the interwar gold standard as it was in its 
classical period. Perhaps the most popular explanation for the gold standard´s smooth 
operation during the classical gold standard is that it was a managed system, and that the 
Bank of England managed it. The bank also acted as a lender of last resort during this period. 
London´s influence over international capital flows was so powerful that no other centre 
could afford to ignore events occurring there. When Bank Rate was raised in London, many 
central banks had no choice but to respond by creating further stringency in domestic credit 
markets so as to minimise the loss of gold.47  
But the UK saw increased competition for its leading role during the interwar period. The 
interwar gold standard was organised around two currencies, the British pound and the US 
dollar. The leadership became less clear during this period, and the Bank of England did not 
manage to keep its role as a stabiliser and leader of the system.48  
 
5.1.2 The theoretical framework of the gold standard 
During the gold standard, the monetary units of all the member countries had a fixed gold 
content. The implication was that the value of each country´s currency was fixed in terms of 
all other currencies, with a fixing value called “par value”. The forces of demand and supply 
determined the market rate of exchange between currencies. Because residents in member 
countries freely could export or import gold, the extent to which the market rate could rise 
above or fall below the par rate was limited. The market rate could fluctuate between two 
values, termed the “gold export” and the “gold import” points. The distances between the 
two points could vary over time with transport costs and other costs. 
For example, an arbitrage opportunity would arise if the demand for US dollars in London 
increased so much relative to the supply that the market rate of exchange with sterling rose 
above the parity rate by more than the transportation cost of gold. Then it would have been 
profitable for those that wanted dollars to buy gold in London, then ship it to New York and 
sell it for dollar in that market.  
                                                
47 (Eichengreen, The Gold Standard in Theory and History, 1985, p. 16) 
48 (Eichengreen, The Gold Standard in Theory and History, 1985, p. 21) 
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Gold flows produced short-run balancing of the supply of and demand for foreign exchange. 
The countries had however a finite amount of gold, preventing the gold flows from being 
able to continue indefinitely. The country would eventually run out of gold. Gold imports, 
however, could go on somewhat longer perhaps, but eventually the importing country´s 
trading partners would exhaust their supplies of gold.49 
 
The adjustment mechanism  
The point Hume´s price-specie-flow model was to demonstrate that policymakers could rely 
on the gold standard to eliminate external imbalances automatically. Hume´s model gives us 
a simplified explanation of the adjustment mechanism and how the gold standard worked. 
His analysis highlighted the close connection between gold movements and money supply.50  
This model assumes a world where the banks were negligible and there only existed two 
commodities; a consumer good and gold. Each time a consumer good was exported, the 
exporter received payment in gold. He then took the gold to the mint to have it coined. 
Thereby he increased the amount of money circulating in the economy, something that 
would increase the prices. On the other hand, when a merchant imported the consumer good, 
he made the payment by exporting gold. This reduced the amount of money circulating in 
the economy, making the prices fall.  
Hence, the price level would fall in a country with trade deficit and rise in a country with 
trade surplus. This was due to a self-correcting chain of events depending on the amount of 
gold or coins circulating in the economy. The decreased prices in the trade deficit country 
would make the country´s goods relatively cheaper than the goods in the trade surplus 
country. This would increase exports from the deficit country and decrease export from the 
surplus country, continuing until the trade imbalance was eliminated.51  The process is 
explained in Figure 8 below.  
                                                
49 (Kenwood & Lougheed, 1999, pp. 111-112) 
50  (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, 1992, p. 32) 
51 (Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital - A History of the International Monetary System, 1998, p. 25) 
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Figure 8: Price – Specie – Flow Model 
 
Source: (Brautaset, 2005), at NHH, 08.09.2005 
 
Interest setting - The rules of the game  
The price-specie-flow model was developed further in the late nineteenth century in a 
number of ways. The most important elaboration concerned the effects of gold movements 
on the monetary policy of the central banks. The central bank´s discount rate was the 
instrument controlling the adjustment mechanisms that made sure that the balance of 
payments was in balance.52  
As the economist H. F Fraser (1933) put it, “The successful working of the gold standard 
does not require the value of the goods exported and imported to balance. What it requires is 
that the debits and credits of a nation should equalize one another… It is not the balance of 
trade in the narrow sense of the word but the balance of payments which matters”53.  
The balancing of payments should be done by setting the central bank interest rate according 
to the rules of the game, similar in function as described in section 4.5.1 under the 
                                                
52 (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, 1992, p. 35) 
53 (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, 1992, p. 35) 
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adjustment problem with flexibility. If the ratio of gold reserves in a central bank persistently 
declined due to high import levels, the central bank interest rate should be raised. This would 
prevent further depletion of the reserves because it would place an upward pressure on 
market interest rates. Higher market interest rates would attract capital from abroad, stopping 
the draining of gold reserves.  
But if the interest rates were repeatedly raised to attract foreign capital, the volume of 
foreign indebtedness would eventually be unsustainable. Hence, in order to eliminate the 
imbalance created by a permanent disturbance it would have to be done through altering 
domestic conditions as well. This effect worked through the restriction on capital from the 
higher interest rate.54 This restriction would have an adverse effect on business activity and 
employment and lead to a fall in prices and wages, which would reinforce the direct effects 
of the price-specie-flow mechanism. If gold on the other hand were flowing in increasing the 
reserves, the central bank interest rate should decrease. This would stimulate the domestic 
activity and generate an upward pressure on wages and prices.  
The rules of the game required the central banks to raise the interest rates when facing gold 
outflows, and reduce interest rates when facing gold inflows. The central banks should 
reinforce the impact on domestic financial markets, thereby promoting adjustment. The 
opposite would be to neutralize the impacts, called sterilisation.55  
 
Conditions for the system 
There are four essential conditions for the operation of the gold standard. First, for every 
country within the system, a gold value must be fixed for the currency. The second condition 
is that there must be free movement of gold between countries and within the system. 
Thirdly, the monetary system of all member countries must be such that the domestic money 
supply is linked more or less automatically to movements of gold in and out of the country. 
If these rules are satisfied, the adjustment functions of the system will be satisfied and they 
will reach external equilibrium. But if this is to be accompanied by domestic equilibrium, a 
                                                
54 (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, 1992, p. 35) 
55 (Scammell, 1985) 
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forth condition is necessary; there must be a high degree of wage flexibility within each 
country.56 
For the countries within the system, this model involved a conflict between member 
countries’ external and domestic stability. External stability means the stability of its balance 
of payments while domestic stability refers to a steady price level, full employment and 
some measure of economic growth, as explained in section 4.5. Price changes following 
adjustments in the balance of payments could be accompanied by changes in output and 
employment if rigidities were present in the economy. This could be seriously destabilising. 
Only if prices and wage costs were infinitely flexible would gold standard adjustment be a 
tolerable process for a participant country.57  
 
5.2 The European Monetary Union 
The first section presents the history leading to the EMU, followed by the theoretical 
framework of the union.  
 
5.2.1 The history leading to the euro 
The idea of establishing an economic and monetary union in Europe goes back a long time. 
Already in 1952, six countries founded the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). 
The same six countries established the European Economic Community (EEC) in 195858. Its 
initial objective was to remove trade barriers rather than usurping the dollar´s international 
role. But the plans for greater European integration advanced through the 1960s, leading up 
to ambitions of an economic and monetary union with an irrevocable fixing of the European 
exchange rates. 
                                                
56 (Scammell, 1985) 
57 (Scammell, 1985) 
58 (European Central Bank, 2011a, p. 4) 
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The European Monetary System (EMS) was established in 1979. This was a system of 
arrangements to coordinate and enhance the effectiveness of currency market management. 
They wanted to create a “zone of monetary stability in Europe”. By March 1979, eight 
currencies were trading according to rules that were dictated by the new Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM)59.  
The ERM system was not intended to be a regime of fixed exchange rates before the 
Maastricht treaty put a new gloss on it in February 1992. The Treaty adopted a timetable, 
eventually leading up toward a single currency and established the European Union (EU) 
under its current name. The European Currency Unit (ECU), later known as the euro, was 
planned to be introduced in 1999, and would replace national currencies.60  
 
National requirements  
Four criteria for new applicant countries were agreed upon in the Maastricht Treaty. The first 
concerned price stability and stated that the country´s inflation could not exceed 1½-
percentage points the average of the three best performing states.  
The second requirement was that the annual budget deficit should not be larger than 3 per 
cent and outstanding government debt should be kept below 60 per cent of GDP.61 These 
requirements are also guiding for member countries through the rule-based framework of the 
Stability and Growth Pact. This is meant to safeguard sound public finances in member 
states. The original Pact imposed a fine if public debt and annual budget deficits were not 
kept within these limits.62  
Third, the applicant had to be an ERM member and maintain its currency within a narrow 
band for at least two years. The fourth criteria was that the average long-term interest rates 
                                                
59 (Minikin, 1993, p. 11) 
60 (Minikin, 1993, p. 38) 
61 (Minikin, 1993, p. 48) 
62 (March, 2009, p. 212) 
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should not exceed the average for the three best performing Member States by more than 2 
per cent.  
The signing of the Maastricht Treaty represented a high point in hopes that there would be 
speedy progress toward a monetary union. Despite many political disagreements and 
obstacles, as the EMS crisis in the early 1990, the euro was introduced as planned on 1 
January 1999.63  
 
The Euro area 
At the introduction date, eleven EU member states – Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland – adopted the 
euro. This was considered a radical move. Together the member countries formed the second 
largest single currency area in the world, and it has become the second most important 
international currency since then. Only the US is ranked above.64 
Several countries have joined since the introduction in 1999, among them Greece in 2001. In 
2012, the euro is shared by 17 of the EU member states, and together they make up the euro 
area65. The euro is breaking down barriers between people, companies and markets, and is 
the first currency that has not only severed its link to gold, but also its link to the nation-
state.66  
 
Not a political union 
EMU is responsible for the monetary policy and assigns it to its independent central bank, 
the European Central Bank (ECB). However, the member countries still have a large degree 
of political sovereignty in most other areas. The union is only a monetary union, and fiscal 
                                                
63 (Minikin, 1993, p. 48) 
64 (Economic and Financial Affairs, 2008) 
65 (European Central Bank, 2011b) 
66 (March, 2009, pp. 2-3) 
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and general economic policies remain in the hands of separate governments. This allows 
them to pursue domestic stabilisation goals, albeit within some bounds and in line with the 
Growth and Stability Pact. They have committed to conduct their fiscal policies in a manner 
that is consistent with the goal of ensuring sustainability of public finances and maintaining 
price stability. 67  
If a potential economic shock has implications for euro area-wide inflation, the primary 
instrument should be monetary policy from ECB. If the shock instead is country-specific, 
temporary and does not impinge on the euro average, the appropriate instrument is national 
fiscal policy, where there is no clear case for coordination.68  
 
5.2.2 The theoretical framework of the European Monetary Union 
The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) compromises the ECB and the National 
Central Banks (NCBs) of all EU member states. The NCB´s have legal personalities, which 
are separate from that of the ECB, but they operate in line with the ECB´s guidelines and 
instructions. The decision-making bodies within ECB are the Governing Council and the 
Executive Board.  
The Governing Council makes the monetary decisions within the ECB and formulates the 
single monetary policy of the union. The Executive Board implements their decisions as the 
organ responsible for the daily management of ECB. They also give instructions to the 
NCB´s, whose main tasks are to contribute to the policy decisions of the Governing Council 
and to execute the decisions within its own countries.69  
 
                                                
67 (Economic and Financial Affairs, 2008, p. 64) 
68 (Coppel, Serres, & Hoeller, 1999, pp. 12-13) 
69 (Coppel, Serres, & Hoeller, 1999, p. 57)  
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Interest setting  
The interest-rate setting is unified across the EMU area70. The ECB established a single 
basic interest rate based on average conditions throughout the relatively heterogeneous 
currency area. They pursue a quantitative definition of price stability rather than an explicit 
inflation target. The interest rate should be set in order to achieve a rate of change of the 
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) close to, but below 2 per cent per annum.71  
Differences in EMU member’s interest rates would arise if countries could set its interest 
rate in order to meet purely domestic targets. The economic performance across the currency 
block would have to be completely smooth in order to get perfect interest rate conditions. 
But the union operates with a “one-rate-fits-all” interest policy because of the fundamental 
tenet within EMU; that one size manifestly does not fit all. The principal adjustment 
mechanism in the monetary union is based on this insight. 72  
 
The adjustment mechanisms  
Disharmonised interest rates are designed to act as a means of adjustment for euro members 
in a similar way as the flows of gold regulated economic behaviour during the gold standard.  
Countries that are expanding slower than the euro average, and therefore have a lower 
inflation rate, will be constrained by a higher interest rate than would normally be required. 
Incentives to increase efficiency and productivity, which eventually will reduce production 
costs, will arise. This will improve the country´s competitiveness over time, and lead to 
higher economic growth. But the adjustment mechanism has the negative side effect of 
higher unemployment in the transition phase to higher growth.  
The countries that are expanding faster than the euro average, with a higher inflation rate, 
will have a lower interest rate than would otherwise be the case. This tends to increase 
inflation. The following reduced competitiveness will increase imports and worsen their 
                                                
70 (March, 2009, p.7) 
71 (Economic and Financial Affairs, 2008, p. 65) 
72 (March, 2009, pp. 244-245) 
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balance of payments positions. Eventually these effects will reduce growth rates toward 
more sustainable levels around the euro average.73 The adjustments are presented in Figure 9 
below. 
Figure 9: Adjustment in the EMU  
 
 
Conditions of the system 
There are four main “shock absorber” mechanisms that might limit the potential cost of 
foregoing national monetary policy independence. The first mechanism is more flexible 
factor markets, where especially labour is important. This compromises both wage flexibility 
and labour mobility. The three others are more flexible product markets, national fiscal 
policy and greater integration of capital and credit markets, which would permit 
consumption smoothing.74  
 
 
                                                
73 (March, 2009, pp. 244-245) 
74 (Coppel, Serres, & Hoeller, 1999, p. 114) 
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6. Part III - Discussion and analysis 
In this part the factors presented in section 2.2 will be discussed for the gold standard and the 
EMU according to the problem of this assignment. First I will look at the gold standard, then 
at the EMU, and then a comparison of the two follow.  
The factors I will discuss are (1) the central bank interest rate policy and the rules of the 
game, (2) imbalances in exchange rates and (3) debt levels between member countries, (4) 
the system’s ability to handle fundamental changes and the (5) credibility of the monetary 
union. Are these factors present in the EMU today? 
 
6.1 Interest setting and the rules of the game 
I want to look at the interest rates of the monetary unions and see if they were set according 
to the rules of the game, explained in section 5.1.2 about the theoretical framework of the 
gold standard. Central theory for the discussion is the difficulty of obtaining both domestic 
and external equilibriums, explained in the adjustment problem in section 4.5.2. The 
relationship between unemployment and inflation, explained by the Phillips curve in section 
4.8, is also important for the understanding of the problem.  
I will first look at the interest setting in the two periods in each of the monetary unions. Then 
I will compare this with gold reserves for gold member countries and with balance of 
payments for the EMU countries.  
 
6.1.1 The gold standard 
Interest setting 
Each country had its own central bank that decided the national interest rates. The interest 
rates were however required to be set according to the rules of the game in order for the 
mechanisms to work and make to gold flow in stabilising directions. The system´s resilience 
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was attributed to the willingness of national monetary authorities to refrain from preventing 
this international adjustment process in its workings.75  
But following the reestablishment of the gold standard after WWI, it is alleged that central 
banks failed to play as faithful by these rules as they did in the pre-war period 76. After 1925 
several central banks started sterilising gold flows instead of following the rules of the game. 
This caused them to intervene in ways that disrupted the international adjustment 
mechanism77. It was essential to the safety of the reserves to maintain the connection 
between a gold drain and a rise in the rate of discount. Unless this twofold check was kept in 
working order, the whole currency system could be imperilled78. 
One of the explanations for this development was changed political circumstances in the 
1920s. One of the most significant developments of the period was according to Robert 
Triffin the growing importance of domestic factors as the final determinant of monetary 
policies. The economic consequences from following the rules of the game could be harsh 
on the domestic economy because it depressed the economy in hard times by increasing 
interest rates and contracting money supply. The central banks faced a short-term trade-off 
between unemployment and inflation. An interest rate increase would increase 
unemployment and also the government´s cost of servicing its public debt, while a decrease 
would reduce inflation.  Even though most central banks were independent, they were not 
immune from pressure to protect the government from its burdens.79 This made it more 
difficult to follow the rules as mechanically as demanded by the theory of the gold standard. 
If they had decided to cut the link to gold they would have had greater freedom to pursue 
independent economic policies. A depreciation of the currency would for many countries 
have removed the urgent need of cutting government spending and raising taxes in order to 
defend the exchange rate.80 Before the war it had been clear that the governments of the gold 
                                                
75  (Eichengreen, Watson, & Grossman, Bank Rate Policy Under the Interwar Gold Standard, 1993) 
76  (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, 1992, p. 36) 
77  (Eichengreen, The Gold Standard in Theory and History, 1985, p. 21) 
78  (Eichengreen, The Gold Standard in Theory and History, 1985, p. 177) 
79  (Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital - A History of the International Monetary System, 1998, p. 29) 
80  (Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital - A History of the International Monetary System, 1998, p. 88) 
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standard´s industrial core were prepared to defend the system81. When this was not as 
obvious anymore, central banks were facing a more difficult dilemma. Why would they 
depress their economies in order to defend the monetary system if they were not sure that the 
other governments did the same?  
From Figure 10 we can see that Germany kept its interest rate higher than the other gold 
standard countries. This was partly because of their fear and resent experience with 
hyperinflation, but it also made them an attractive destination for funds. France and 
Germany absorbed nearly all of the increase in global monetary reserves in the second half 
of 1920s, but Germany was still struggling with war reparation payments to the US, France 
and UK.  
Figure 10: Central Bank Discount Rates, January 1928 – August 1930 
 
Source:  (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1943, pp. 439, 656-659) 
 
                                                
81  (Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital - A History of the International Monetary System, 1998, p. 72) 
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Unbalances  
The purpose of the rules of the game was to even out imbalances between countries. In this 
new policy environment with countries sterilising the gold flows, these imbalances were not 
corrected with the same speed as before. It was therefore no longer obvious that a currency´s 
weakness was temporary.82 The consequence of refusing to follow the rules was more lasting 
unbalances between surplus and deficit countries because they prevented the adjustment 
mechanisms from working efficiently.   
The asymmetries in possible responses of surplus and deficit countries further increased the 
imbalances. The deficit countries could not conduct sterilisation operations to the same 
extent as the surplus countries could. They were constrained to raise interest rates and 
contract their money supply in order to hold enough gold reserves to maintain their gold 
parities. There were no such constraints for the surplus countries, which could sterilise gold 
flows and accumulate gold.83 This asymmetry shifted the burden of adjustment onto those 
with relatively weak external positions84. 
Figure 11: Gold Reserves of Central Banks and Governments, 1918 - 1932 
 
Source: (Hardy, 1936, p. 93) 
                                                
82  (Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital - A History of the International Monetary System, 1998, p. 88) 
83  (Eichengreen, Watson, & Grossman, Bank Rate Policy Under the Interwar Gold Standard, 1993, p. 57) 
84  (Eichengreen, The Gold Standard in Theory and History, 1985, p. 21) 
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As we can see from Figure 11, the US and France accumulated massive amounts of gold 
over the period between 1918 and 1932. Countries as Britain and Germany were squeezed as 
intense balance of payment pressure were placed on them.85 The worldwide misdistribution 
of gold stocks shifted the burden of adjustment onto countries with precarious reserve 
positions86. This made it difficult for them to increase the activity level in their economies. 
This unbalance was partly because central banks failed to set the interest rates according to 
the rules of the game. 
 
6.1.2 The EMU 
Interest setting 
Since the EMU excludes sovereign monetary policy, the countries cannot set their own 
national interest rates. The interest rate is set on average conditions of the member states and 
is equal for all member states87. This makes it impossible for the countries in the EMU to 
play by the rules of the game as described for the gold standard countries. Instead, the 
countries need to rely on other adjustment mechanisms in order to make the capital flow in 
stabilising directions, as explained in section 5.2.2.   
 
Unbalances 
The business cycles within the union have become increasingly more synchronised across 
the member countries after the introduction of the EMU. Hence, the need for national 
stabilisation policies over and above the stabilising impact of the single monetary policy has 
been diminishing.88 But there are still large differences in the economic state of the different 
countries as we can see from Figure 12.  
                                                
85  (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, 1992, p. 192) 
86 (Eichengreen, Watson, & Grossman, Bank rate policy under the interwar gold standard, 1993, pp. 57-70) 
87 (March, 2009, p. 206) 
88 (Economic and Financial Affairs, 2008, p. 21) 
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Figure 12: Balance of Payments for EMU countries, 1999 – 2011 
 
Source: (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012a) 
Figure 12 proves how large the imbalances in the balance of payments between the member 
countries are. Since all the countries have the same interest rate, the deficit countries are 
unable to raise their interest rates to attract more capital. Some have argued that the interest 
rate has been too high for the northern European countries and too low for the southern 
European countries in the years before 200989. This has contributed to the large differences 
we see in the balance of payments between the countries, and might make it difficult for the 
economies to converge toward each other.  
 
6.1.3 Comparison of the gold standard and the EMU 
What to compare?  
In order to determine if the rules of the game actually were broken in the interwar gold 
standard, I will compare gold reserves and the national interest rates of the gold member 
countries and see if the changes were according to the rules of the game.  
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As the EMU does not have gold, I will compare the ECB interest rate with national balances 
of payments for the EMU countries. As mentioned in section 5.1.2, it can be argued that it is 
the balance of payments that matters. Even if they do not have the option to change their 
interest rates according to the rules, it is still possible to see if the common interest rate 
follows the rules better for some countries than others. Is the exclusion of nationally decided 
interest rates and the rules of the game in EMU a weakness for the EMU cooperation? 
 
Data 
In lack of data over German and French interest rates for the 1920s, I will only look at the 
UK´s Bank Rate and the US Discount Rate for the gold standard members. Unfortunately it 
is difficult to find data for this period, so the estimates for the gold standard is relatively thin. 
The estimates range only from 1925 to 1929. Even if it is a short time interval it still gives an 
indication of the interest setting compared to the gold reserves in the period. For the EMU 
members I use data from 1999 to 2011. 
I have looked at the absolute change in the gold reserves and balance of payments, and 
compared it to the changes in the interest rate. I have used annual data, as short-term changes 
normally would not require changes in the interest rates. Changes within each year are 
therefore not captured in this analysis.  
 
Results 
Figure 13 displays the interest rates for the gold standard countries, while Table 2 presents 
the interest rates, gold reserves and the results from the analysis.   
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Figure 13 – Bank Rate and Federal Reserve Bank of New York Discount rate, 1925 - 1930 
 
Sources: Bank Rate: (Mitchell & Deane, 1962), (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, 1943), (Bank of England). US Discount rate: (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 1943, pp. 440-441) 
 
Table 2: Comparison of Gold Reserves and Interest Rates, 1925 – 1929 
 
Source: Gold reserves: (Hardy, 1936, p. 93), Interest rates: Same as for Figure 13 
Following this simple analysis, interest rates have been changed according to the rules of the 
game in 25 per cent of the changes for both countries. We can see clear indications of 
violations of the rules from these results, even if this should be interpreted with caution due 
to the low volume of data material used.  
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Figure 14 presents the ECB long-term interest rate. Table 3 gives the comparison of this 
interest rate with the member countries balances of payments.  
Figure 14: ECB Long Term Interest Rate, January 1999 – January 2012 
 
Source: (European Central Bank, 2012) 
Table 3: Comparison of Balance of Payments and ECB Interest Rate, 1999 – 2011 
 
Source: Balance of Payments: (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2012a), ECB Interest Rate: (European Central Bank, 2012) 
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The red fields in Table 3 represent interest changes violating the rules of the game, while the 
green fields are interest changes that correspond to the rules of the game. We can see that the 
annual interest changes for France and Germany have been following the rules in 33,3 and 
41,7 per cent of the years, while the average is higher for the PIIGS countries, with numbers 
ranging from 41,7 per cent and up to 70,0 per cent. These results can indicate that the ECB 
interest rate has been following the rules of the game for the PIIGS countries to a larger 
extent than for Germany and France. Total average tells us that the rules have been followed 
in around 48,8 per cent of the interest changes for the EMU countries.  
The darker green fields are the interest changes that in addition have a deflationary effect on 
the economy, i.e. the interest rate is increased as the balance of payment is decreasing. The 
PIIGS countries and France have all experienced changes like this in 25 per cent to 33,3 per 
cent of the cases. Germany, on the other hand, has had only 8,3 per cent of these deflationary 
interest changes as its annual balance of payment has increased since 2000, expect from in 
2008-2009 during the Financial Crisis.    
Following the line of the rules of the game, increased interest rate with decreasing reserves 
would increase competitiveness in the country by reducing the price level and attracting 
foreign capital. But the problem is that the deflationary effects are not meet by the opposite 
interest changes in the surplus countries, as Germany. If the German interest rate had been 
decreased, this would have increased the possibility of capital flowing out from Germany 
and into the relatively higher interest rate countries. When the increases in interest rates in 
deficit countries are not met with interest rate decreases in the surplus countries, the 
increased capital inflow to the deficit countries will not follow in the same degree. Instead 
they only get the deflationary effects.  
 
Concluding remarks 
After having looked at interest rates compared to the rules of the game I found that the rules 
were not followed mechanically by the gold standard countries and in average only in 48,8 
per cent of the interest rate changes for the EMU countries. While the gold standard 
countries had national interest rates, the EMU countries have one common interest rate. The 
implication of the common rate is that increased interest rate with deflationary effects in 
deficit countries will not met by decreased interest rates in surplus countries. This increases 
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the imbalances further because it has made it difficult for deficit countries to attract capital 
when their balance of payments is decreasing.  
 
6.2 Instability in the exchange rates  
In this section I will look at the real exchange rates within the monetary unions. The PPP 
theory in section 4.3 explains that inflation differentials between countries give divergent 
nominal and real exchange rates, and this is important for the discussion. Since the nominal 
exchange rates are fixed in the two monetary unions imbalances in the real exchange rates 
might give rise to diverging competitiveness and trade imbalances.  
The reasons for having fixed exchange rates are listed in section 4.2.1. One of the reasons is 
reduced exchange rate volatility that might increase international trade. Also the OCA theory 
in section 4.6 says that increased trade integration increases symmetry in a monetary union, 
which might lead to fewer asymmetric shocks. It is therefore important to look at trade 
between countries to see if the fixed exchange rates benefit individual countries in the 
monetary unions.  
Based on this theoretical foundation, I will focus the discussion on the initial fixing of the 
nominal exchange rates and strong economies actions influencing their domestic inflation 
levels. The last section is devoted to the level of international trade and possible trade 
barriers in the monetary unions.  
 
6.2.1 The gold standard 
The initial fixing of the exchange rates 
Most countries wanted to return to the successful pre-war monetary regime as fast as 
possible after the war. Due to large war expenditures and money printing during the WWI, 
high inflation had occurred in most countries. But the inflation varied and prices had 
increased less quickly in the US than in Britain, and less quickly in Britain than in many 
parts of Europe. These divergences in price levels had to be reversed to in order to allow the 
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restoration of pre-war parities.90 Some of the countries chose to deflate their economies and 
go back to their pre-war parity, while others devaluated their currency. The implication of 
this was that the interwar gold standard started off with imbalances that might have 
imperilled the whole system. 
Figure 15: Sterling/dollar Exchange Rate, 1921 - 1925  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Morgan, 1952, pp. 351-355) 
Figure 15 presents the sterling/dollar exchange rate from 1921 to 1925, when Britain was 
back at its par value on $4.86. The sterling had a hard way back on pre-war parity, and the 
US could have made life a bit easier for them if they had adopted more inflationary policies. 
Unfortunately for Britain, the US continued to accumulate free gold to back their monetary 
expansions instead of cooperating to ease their burden.91 
Churchill´s argument defending the choice of returning to the pre-war parity was that if they 
tampered with the parity once it would send a signal that the authorities might be prepared to 
do so again. An eventual loss of international financial business that might follow 
uncertainty about gold convertibility level would damage Britain and its financial interests. 
                                                
90  (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, 1992, p. 104) 
91 (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, 1992, pp. 164-165) 
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But the relationship between British and foreign prices had not yet been restored and the fact 
that the exchange rate had moved before the price level meant that British prices were too 
high.92  
The US was on the gold standard throughout the 1920s, while most countries had restored 
their convertibility by the end of 192593. The US dollar was significantly undervalued in 
1923 and 1924, and slightly undervalued in 192594. France returned to gold at a significantly 
depreciated rate relative to the pre-1913 gold standard rate95. On a unit cost basis, in terms of 
sterling, the franc was undervalued by approximately 20 per cent96. This undervaluation, 
combined with large speculative balances that moved out of France before the stabilisation, 
made life difficult for London. Also Germany had an overvalued currency 97. 
 
The US and war repayments 
About $1 billion in war debt related transfers to the US were completed between mid-1926 
and mid-193198. These transactions augmented the flows of gold and foreign exchange 
toward the US and strengthened their balance of payments, weakening that of other 
countries. The logical response to these flows would be increased prices and costs in the 
United States, but this did not take place. Instead, the US lent much of its surplus back to 
Europe and other parts of the world and kept its competitiveness, which can be measured by 
the real exchange rate. By refusing to let domestic prices increase, the US enhanced the 
imbalances in the real exchange rates.99 The capital flows are to be seen in Figure 16 below.  
 
                                                
92  (Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital - A History of the International Monetary System, 1998, pp. 58-60) 
93  (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, 1992, p. 187) 
94 (Moggridge, 1972, p. 105).  
95  (Solomou, 1996) 
96 (Moggridge, 1972, p. 105).  
97  (Solomou, 1996, p. 29) 
98 (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, 1992, p. 224) 
99  (Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital - A History of the International Monetary System, 1998, pp. 60-70) 
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Figure 16: The Flow of Wealth Involved in War Debt Payments 
 
Source: (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-
1939, 1992, p. 225) (Approximated numbers)  
As long as the capital exports persisted, Europe´s current account deficit could persist.100  
The deficit countries also spent the capital they imported on consumption rather than 
investment. They failed in using the capital on long-term investments that could have 
improved their competitiveness.101 
 
Trade and imbalances 
One of the benefits from having fixed exchange rates is reduced volatility and the increased 
international trade following this102. But there was a rise of trade barriers in the late 1920s, 
and this prevented trade between countries. Countries thereby missed one of the benefits 
from having a fixed exchange rate system.  
The link between trade and gold movements was also strong, as explained in the gold 
standard theory in section 5.1.2, and free movement of gold within the system was one of the 
                                                
100  (Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital - A History of the International Monetary System, 1998, pp. 60-70) 
101  (Eichengreen, When Currencies Collapse, 2012) 
102 (Obstfeld & Rogoff, 1995, pp. 76-77) 
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conditions for the working of the gold standard103. The trade barriers disrupted this 
condition. Figure 17 displays the decline in imports in the US after the Tariff Acts of 1922 
and 1930.  
Figure 17: Decline in US Imports Following Tariff Act of 1922 and 1930, 1922-1934 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Adler, 1945) 
The barriers interfered with the ability of the deficit countries to restore their balance by 
increasing exports and caused concentration of gold reserves in the most protectionist 
countries104. Goods from the undervalued currency countries were relatively cheaper than the 
goods from the countries with overvalued currencies. When strong-currency countries as the 
US imposed trade barriers they were able to remain in persistent surplus. It also further 
depressed demand in the deficit countries. Weak-currency countries like Britain and 
Germany were saddled with chronic balance of payment deficits and haemorrhaged gold and 
exchange reserves.105 
                                                
103  (Scammell, 1985) 
104  (Eichengreen, The Gold Standard in Theory and History, 1985, p. 21) 
105  (Eichengreen, When Currencies Collapse, 2012) 
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6.2.2 The EMU 
The initial fixing of the exchange rates 
When the EMU finally was established, they had to set the conversion rate for each of the 
participating countries. As this fixing was permanent, it was crucial for the performance of 
the monetary union that these were fixed at the right terms.106  
After the monetary turmoil in 1992-93, Western Europe was effectively split across a north-
south divide of “hard” and “soft” currency blocks. The hard block did not suffer 
devaluations and consisted of stronger currency countries, among them Germany. The 
weaker southern countries included the PIGS countries, i.e. Portugal, Ireland, Greece and 
Spain, and they were all suffering from higher inflation rates than the German-lead group. 
This weaker group was eager to lock exchange rates against the German D-Mark after 
recurring foreign exchange attacks from rumours of devaluation. This could give them 
protection against uncontrolled flows of global capital.107  
In the weeks before the permanent fixing of the exchange rates and the birth of the euro it 
became clear that Germany would grant its European partners a favour. They started off the 
new currency at a relatively high conversion rate for the D-Mark, thereby giving the other 
euro area countries an initial competitive boost.108  
 
Germany and wage growth 
The wage cost development has differed a lot between countries, and there is little doubt that 
divergent national wage policies are partly to be blamed for this. Germany has followed a 
tight policy of wage moderation since 1999, as seen from Figure 18. The figure presents the 
yearly nominal wage increases in Germany compared with the rest of the Eurozone when 
excluding Germany. We observe a strong decline in nominal wage increases in Germany 
                                                
106 (March, 2009, p. 176) 
107 (March, 2009, p. 176) 
108 (March, 2009, p. 204) 
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compared with other member countries. The rest of the Eurozone maintained wage increases 
that have exceeded Germany by 1 to 2 per cent per year.109  
Figure 18: Yearly Nominal Wage Increases in Germany and the Rest of the Eurozone,   
1999 - 2008 
 
Source: (Grauwe, International Money: Postwar Trends and Theories - Digitized version, 
2008, p. 111) 
Two of the reasons for Germany´s lower wage increases were too high wage costs at the 
euro entry and decreased power of labour unions compared to other EMU countries. The 
lower wage increases make Germany relatively more competitive compared to the other 
member countries because of its relatively lower wage costs.110  
 
Trade and imbalances 
The initial objective of EEC when founded was to remove trade barriers111. After a long 
process of eliminating tariffs and quotas, the European Single Market became a reality in 
                                                
109 (Grauwe, International Money: Postwar Trends and Theories - Digitized version, 2008, p. 111) 
110 (Grauwe, International Money: Postwar Trends and Theories - Digitized version, 2008, p. 111) 
111 (European Central Bank, 2011a, p. 4) 
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1993112. But Germany´s strong position and low wage growth has caused imbalances despite 
this effort and is at the heart of the imbalance problem.113  
The fixed European exchange rate has provided disproportionate support for Germany´s 
export oriented economy. By making its industrial sales very competitive throughout most of 
Europe, the exchange rate has increased export surplus to record levels and diverted the 
attention from the necessary task of stimulating domestic demand. The rebalancing of the 
German economy after the unification also caused a fall in worker´s income. This weakened 
domestic demand and encouraged a shift of productivity resources towards export. A 
combination of the fixed exchange rates and their success in holding the costs down led to an 
increased price competitiveness against the other members in the union 114.  
 As we can see from Figure 19, German export growth is increasing, both with the world and 
also within the euro area.  
Figure 19: Exports by Germany, 1998 - 2009 
 
Source: (International Monetary Fund, 2010) (European Commission, 2010) 
                                                
112 (European Commission, 2012c) 
113 (March, 2009, p. 3) 
114 (March, 2009, p. 3) 
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6.2.3 Comparison of the gold standard and the EMU 
What to compare? 
In both monetary unions there seem to be problems with over- and undervalued currencies. 
During the gold standard this happened because some countries devalued their currencies 
when returning to the gold standard, while others returned to their pre-war parity. In the 
EMU the imbalances have occurred mainly because of different economic development 
between countries after the fixing of the exchange rates.  
The PPP theory tells us that if inflation differs between the countries, the real exchange rates 
will also differ. I will therefore start the comparison by looking at how the inflation levels 
differ between countries for both unions, and also at the real exchange rates for the EMU 
countries. Unfortunately I do not have the corresponding real exchange rates for the gold 
standard countries. Then I will look at international trade in the two unions, although with 
some different measurements.  
 
Inflation and real exchange rates 
The two following figures illustrate how big the differences between gold standard countries 
were after the WWI. Figure 20a pictures the inflation levels between 1914 and 1920. There 
are large differences between member countries, as Germany had inflation of almost 900 per 
cent while the US only had 100 per cent. And this was before the hyperinflation in Germany 
set in.  
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Figure 20a: Inflation 1914 – 1920  Figure 20b: Exchange Rates 1920     
(Par Value = 100) 
 
Source: (Grytten, Etterkrigsdepresjonen på 1920-tallet, 2011) 04.10.2011, NHH 
Figure 20b displays the exchange rates in 1920, where the par value is equal to 100. 
Germany was the country with the highest inflation during the war, and therefore the country 
where the money lost most of its value. The currencies that lost value had to raise interest 
rates and decrease its money stock in order to increase the value back to pre-war par value 
again. But as described in the previous section, not all countries did do this all the way. That 
resulted in the imbalances we saw in the interwar period.  
Figure 21a shows annual changes in Consumer Price Index (CPI) in 12 of the EMU 
members from 1999 – 2008. We can see that there is limited evidence of CPI inflation levels 
reverting toward the group average. Germany is an average low inflation country, while 
particularly Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal are high average CPI inflation countries.  
The numbers in Figure 21b are based on real exchange rates within the euro area. We can see 
that Ireland, Spain, Greece and Portugal have appreciated in real terms relative to an average 
of their internal trading partners. Since the nominal exchange rate is fixed, this appreciation 
in the real exchange rate makes these countries less competitive.115  
 
                                                
115 (Wihlborg, Willett, & Zhang, 2009, pp. 12-13) 
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Figure 21a: CPI Changes, 1999–2008 (2000=100)  Figure 21b: Real Effective Exchange 
Rate Index, 1999 - 2007 
 
Source: (Wihlborg, Willett, & Zhang, 2009, pp. 12-13) 
 
International trade 
Trade tariffs reduced US imports during the 1920s, as already mentioned. The export 
volumes to the US and North America are indexed in Table 4, and it can be seen, as 
expected, that there were large decreases towards 1932.  
Something worth noticing is that the British export is declining over the whole period as 
opposed to the French and German export that is increasing far into the 1920s. This might 
indicate that the UK was struggling with their overvalued exchange rate, and that this had 
implications for their competitiveness and international trade.  
Table 4: Export to the US in the Period 1923 – 1932, Indexed Numbers (1923 = 100) 
 
Sources: Germany; (Liesner, 1989, p. 220), France; (Liesner, 1989, p. 196), UK; (Liesner, 
1989, p. 50)   
French'Export'to'the'U.S.' German'Export'to'the'U.S. UK'Export'to'North'America'*
1923 100 100 100
1926 149 157 90
1929 135 209 86
1932 39 59 33
*Export from UK to North America, not only the U.S.
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Figure 22 shows that there is a negative correlation between the real exchange rates and net 
trade for the relevant EMU members. Countries that have seen their real exchange rates 
appreciate have experienced a negative development in the net export contribution to 
growth. The countries that have had a depreciating real exchange rate have on the other hand 
had a positive net export contribution to growth.  
Spain, Greece and Italy belong in the former group with declining trade contribution. The net 
trade contribution in Portugal has been practically zero as imports slumped along with weak 
domestic demand. Ireland managed to sustain export-driven growth despite a loss in cost 
competitiveness. This might be because of strong comparative advantages in a number of 
specific industries.116  
Figure 22: Real Effective Exchange Rates and the Trade Contribution to Growth 
 
Source: (Economic and Financial Affairs, 2008, p. 58) 
 
                                                
116 (Economic and Financial Affairs, 2008, p. 58) 
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Concluding remarks 
There are inflation differentials between countries that give rise to real exchange rate 
instabilities in both monetary unions. The instabilities were present already at the fixing in 
for gold standard, while differing development has been the main reason for the instabilities 
in the EMU.  
Strong economies within both unions also imposed policies, as sterilisation and wage 
moderation, preventing their domestic price levels to increase relative to foreign levels. This 
enforced the position of their already strong economies in international trade and made it 
more difficult for countries with overvalued currencies to achieve increased export levels.  
Patterns in international trade also suggest that trade was influenced by the imbalances in the 
real exchange rates in both monetary unions. Most evident is the negative correlation 
between the real exchange rate and net trade for the EMU countries.  
But the EMU has one advantage in trade compared to the gold standard. Since the EU started 
up as a trade union, the same trade tariffs as were seen in critical times during the gold 
standard would not arise in the EMU.  
 
6.3 Debt imbalances  
In this section I will look at debt levels in the two unions as very high debt levels in some 
countries might have caused imbalances. The theory of different forms of risk discussed in 
section 4.9 is important in order to understand the development in interest rates for indebted 
countries. Also the theory about the external equilibrium and rigidity in section 4.5.2 is used 
as it focuses on the dilemma between domestic and external equilibrium when there is 
rigidity present in the economy.  
I will start looking at the debt development and consequences from a tighter credit market, 
and then look at possible ways out of the debt situation for the indebted countries. The last 
section is focused on the different implications of the high debt levels for deficit and surplus 
countries.  
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6.3.1 The gold standard 
The debt development  
The post-war period saw the United States emerge not merely as a net creditor country, but 
as the principal source of new international capital flows. This transition followed from the 
neutral status of the US early in the war and its expanded export to the European 
belligerents, paid for by the sale of American securities in New York.117  
The new debt situation made member countries more dependent on the situation in the US, 
making the monetary union more fragile. If the credit stopped coming from the US to 
Germany, that would further stop the debt payments from Germany to France, from France 
to the UK, and then to the US again, as described in Figure 23. The development in debt 
levels and structure made the union less stable and contributed to the breakdown.  
Figure 23: Credit and Debt Flows in the Interwar Period  
 
Source: (Grytten, Den Store Depresjonen, 2011), at NHH, 06.10.2012 
 
Tighter national credit markets – the Great Depression 
Although the US economy continued to expand, events in America were directly responsible 
for the slowdown in other parts of the world. The Federal Reserve became increasingly 
restrictive, and this curtailed US foreign lending in the summer of 1928. There was a 30 per 
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cent drop in US lending between 1927 and 1928, and this understates the speed of the 
shift.118  
The increase in the short- and long-term interest rates can be seen from Figure 24. The short-
term interest rates rose noticeably after 1927, followed by the long-term interest rates. 
Because of the dependency on US capital, this had repercussions for several gold standard 
members. As lending to Germany stopped, it became increasingly difficult for them to 
continue to pay their debts. This caused problems for other countries as well due to the 
fragile debt structure. 
Figure 24: US Interest Rates, Long- and Short-term, 1923-1929 
 
Source: (Hamilton, 1987, pp. 1-25) 
As many countries already had trade deficits, they depended on capital imports from the US 
for their external stability.  When the US foreign lending declined, a strict compression of 
domestic spending was often the only option consistent with continued maintenance of the 
gold standard.119 This further depressed the economy, and made it very difficult for indebted 
countries to get out from the debt situation they were in. They would have to continue to 
borrow money in order to cover their expenses because of reduced income from economic 
activities. 
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The domestic demand curtailed, and there was a consequent fall in relative prices along the 
lines of the price-specie-flow model. This should boost their exports and compress their 
imports, somewhat bridging the gap created by the capital inflows. But in addition to this did 
the lending boom in the 1920s contributed to oversupply, due to the rapid expansion of 
commodity production, which further intensified the downward pressure on prices.120 The 
reduction in prices and costs could have priced European goods back into international 
markets, but there were limits to how far prices could fall without setting in motion a 
deflationary spiral121.  
 
Possible ways out 
There were roughly three different courses of actions that the heavily indebted countries 
could follow. The first option, pursued by virtually every debtor country until 1929, was to 
boost export and limit import, as explained above. This was done to mobilize the foreign 
exchange needed for defending gold convertibility and keep debt service current. 
Governments had to cut public spending and raise taxes, and many people blamed the policy 
for worsening the economic crisis or shifting its burden onto the working class. The drop in 
commodity prices in 1929 rendered even the most heroic effort inadequate. With falling 
domestic prices, debt fixed in nominal terms became increasingly burdensome.122  
A second option was the option most debtors turned to starting from 1931. That was to 
suspend external debt service in order to devote foreign exchange to essential imports. They 
had tried to avoid that choice for a long time, knowing that default would threaten to disrupt 
their access to international capital markets.123  
A third option would be to suspend the gold standard. If they allowed the exchange rate to 
depreciate, governments would not be forced to pursue policies designed to compress 
domestic spending. Again, the fear of losing access to international capital markets stopped 
                                                
120 (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, 1992, pp. 228-230) 
121 (Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital - A history of the International Monetary System, 1998, p. 68) 
122 (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, 1992, pp. 228-231) 
123 (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, 1992, pp. 230-231) 
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many countries from doing this earlier. Convertibility provided a visible signal that the 
government´s financial house was in order and it created confidence between domestic 
savers and foreign investors. 124  
 
Debtor versus creditor countries 
The initial stages of the Great Depression took different forms in debtor and creditor nations. 
The same decline in lending that weakened the capital account balances of the borrowers 
strengthened those of the lenders. Because there were no significant sovereign defaults 
before 1931, the creditors continued to receive interest transfers from abroad. The reserves 
flowed toward the principal net foreign creditors, among them France, the United Kingdom 
and the United States, and their payment positions moved into strong surpluses. The actual 
response in these countries lay between two extremes; to sterilise international reserve flows 
and play by the rule of the game and decrease interest rates with gold inflows.125 As 
discussed under section 6.1, one of the problems in the interwar period was the failure of 
countries to follow the rules of the game.  
 
6.3.2 The EMU 
The debt development 
At the same time as the economic growth increased in Europe in 1997, the German Central 
Bank, Bundesbank, reduced its discount rate to 2,5 per cent. Interest rates throughout Europe 
stated to converge to German levels as the financial markets became increasingly confident 
that the EMU would start on time with a relatively large group. The lower interest rates were 
helpful for some of the countries that were struggling to fulfil the conditions for qualification 
for the EMU.  
                                                
124 (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, 1992, p. 232) 
125 (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, 1992) 
       72 
Lower interest rates significantly reduced the cost of servicing debts for some of the hard-
pressured southern countries, as Italy and Spain. As these traditionally were high interest 
countries, the lower interest rates helped them achieve the 3 per cent budget deficit target. 
This interest level was still in place at the final fixing of the currencies in 1998, and 
prefigured the “corridor” for the interest rate for the ECB in its first decade.126  
Some of the lower income countries, as Greece, used the increased leeway from the euro to 
increase growth. This helped them to close the prosperity gap with the wealthy EMU core, 
but it was achieved at the expense of much higher public- and private-sector debt. 127 Public 
welfare increased, and with this highly increased future government obligations followed.  
Figure 25 presents the debt development since 1995 for the relevant EMU countries. The 
increase in debt level is particularly sharp in 1998-1999 for Greece and in 2007-2008 for 
Ireland, Portugal and Greece.   
 Figure 25: Government Gross Financial Liabilities as Percentage of GDP, 1995- 2013 
 
Source: (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development , 2011a) 
The Growth and Stability Pact was broken by two of the largest countries within the EMU in 
2003, namely Germany and France. Instead of accepting the originally imposed fee, the two 
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joined forces to suspend the sanction mechanism of the Pact.128 This weakened the Pact as a 
preventive mechanism. The Pact was further suspended in 2007 so that countries would be 
able to use expansive financial policies to offset the recessionary risks following the 
Financial Crisis. This further opened the way to an expansion of Europe´s debt and deficit 
levels129.   
 
Tighter national credit markets – the Financial Crisis 
The US financial crises of 2008-2009 made governments step in to avoid the collapse of the 
financial sector, forestall credit contraction and sustain aggregate demand. Expansionary 
fiscal policies helped limiting the decline in output and employment, but it left the 
governments with debt burdens of an unprecedented magnitude.130 This has increased the 
risk accociated with rising sovereign debt burdens and the number of sovereign debt 
downgrades have increased131. The global economy has experienced slow growth since the 
outbreak of this crisis. This has exposed the unsustainable fiscal policies of countries in 
Europe. When growth slows, so do tax revenues. This can make high budget deficits 
unsustainable.  
Greece, which spent heartily for years and failed to undertake fiscal reforms, was one of the 
first to get in trouble. The Greek government had hid its true deficit for many years, but were 
forced to reveal the true size of it in late 2009. Investors responded by demanding higher 
yields on Greek bonds, due to higher perceived risk. This raised the cost of the country´s 
debt burden and necessitated a series of bailouts by the European Union and ECB. Later, 
also the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has contributed to bailout packages. But bond 
yields started increasing in other heavily indebted countries in Europe as investors started to 
                                                
128 (March, 2009, p. 212) 
129 (March, 2009, pp. 230-233) 
130 (Darvas, Pisani-Ferry, & Sapir, 2011) 
131 (Braga & Vincelette, 2011, p. 3) 
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anticipate similar problems there as had occurred in Greece. Ireland and Portugal received 
bailouts in November 2010 and May 2011, respectively.132 
As long as investors are confident that the indebted countries will receive financial 
assistance if debt proves too large for them to pay, they will continue to lend them money. 
But if this confidence disappears, investors risk of losing money increases, and they start 
demanding even higher yields.  Also Italy and Spain have experienced problems with 
spiralling yields and high debt levels, but many fear that these countries are too large to be 
saved if problems continue.133 
  
Possible ways out 
The first option, and also the one the countries currently are following, is to reduce the debt 
by contracting the economy. Some of the EMU members have lived beyond means, and in 
order to get out of the debt crisis they need to cut government spending and/or raise taxes. 
Some of the countries have received bailout packages, as mentioned in the last section, to 
enable them to pay their debt payments, but demands to cut costs comes with the deal. Fiscal 
contraction increases unemployment and decreases economic growth, and might lead 
countries into recession.134 The more an economy grows, the smaller will the debt to GDP 
become and the easier will it be to gain access to fresh money. Countries with growing 
economies can outgrow deficits and debt. But this becomes very difficult for a country with 
low or decreasing economic growth.  
The second option is to default on their debt and let the lenders take the loss. Defaults by 
renegotiations with private lenders have already been made, but an uncontrolled default on 
government debt would mean the end of an EMU membership. The third option would be to 
devaluate themselves out of the crisis. Countries with their own national currency cannot run 
out of money, and they have the option to improve their competitiveness through 
                                                
132 (Kenny, 2012) 
133 (Kenny, 2012) 
134 (Riise, 2012) 
 75 
strengthening or weakening its own currency. In order to chose this option the country would 
have to leave the EMU and reintroduce its old currency.135 
Choosing one of the two last options would most likely mean the end of EMU membership. 
The EMU members are locked even closer together than the members were in the gold 
standard, because countries gave up their national currency in the attempt of making EMU 
irreversible. 136 One might say that they locked the door and threw away the key. It is 
difficult to predict the consequences of breaking out of the EMU since it has never happened 
before. Some of the mentioned consequences from a breakout are bank runs and chaos, even 
harder cuts in government spending due to the lack of bailout packages, many bankruptcies 
and difficulty of paying foreign debt due to lower domestic currency value.137   
 
Debtor versus creditor countries  
Today the Eurozone is divided into a relatively vigorous northern tier with sound finances 
and a southern one with crushing debts and non-existent growth prospects.138 When 
investors are demanding higher yields on the bonds issued by the more indebted countries, 
this increases borrowing costs and drives up their budget deficits.  
At the same time as record high yields are being demanded in some of the very indebted 
countries, Germany hits record low borrowing costs139. The surplus countries can easily get 
fresh credit, while this is increasingly difficult for the hard-pressured southern countries. 
This further widens the differences in growth opportunities and the future economic 
development. Because there is no federal fiscal system to transfer resources from prosperous 
                                                
135 (Riise, 2012) 
136 (March, 2009, p. 238) 
137 (Aale, 2012) 
138 (Eichengreen, When Currencies Collapse, 2012) 
139 (Reuters, 2012) 
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to troubled regions, the indebtedness creates larger imbalances between surplus and deficit 
countries than otherwise would have been the case.140  
 
6.3.3 Comparison of the gold standard and the EMU 
What to compare? 
The countries on the gold standard saw a change in lending patterns after the WWI. The 
same is the case for the EMU countries after the introduction of the euro. This developed 
into substantially high debt levels in some of the countries within both monetary unions. In 
the comparison of the two monetary systems I will look at the origin of the debt and how 
difficult it is to reduce the costs that led to the high debt levels. Then I will focus on the 
consequences from losing the source of credit for the deficit countries.  
 
The rigidity of the debt 
The origin of the debt is a critical factor for how long time it takes to turn the development 
around. The 1920s started out with very high war debts after WWI. Countries had to borrow 
in order to finance the war expenditures, but these costs were gradually reduced as the war 
was over.  
The debt in many EMU countries started to build up as they were improving their welfare 
systems and closing the prosperity gap within the union. Increased public welfare puts large 
future obligations upon governments. These obligations have been a source of concern ever 
since the debt levels ran out of control after the Financial Crisis. Many countries have built 
up welfare systems they no longer can afford, and which they also find politically difficult to 
reduce.141   
                                                
140 (Eichengreen, When Currencies Collapse, 2012) 
141 (Hannesson, 2012)  
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Pensions have been a much-discussed topic when it comes to cutting of government 
expenses after the European Sovereign Debt Crisis started. Shifting demographics are 
causing a lower ratio of workers per retiree. Two contributing factors are that the average 
retiree lives longer in addition to lower birth rates than before. Pensions represent a very 
large and rising share of public expenditure, for some countries more than others due to 
different demographic challenges142.  In Table 5 we can see the development in public 
expenditure on pensions between 1990 and 2007 for the selected EMU countries.   
Table 5: Public Expenditure on Pensions as Percentage of GDP, 1990 - 2007 
 
Source: (Organisation for Economical Co-operation and Development, 2011c) 
Suggestions about necessary pension reforms are met with demonstrations and protesting 
citizens, and even some politicians oppose these suggestions. When the government costs are 
tied up in future public welfare and pensions, and this is difficult and time consuming to 
reduce, the governments face a challenging task.  
It seems like a more politically challenging task to turn the debt development around in 2012 
than it was in the 1920s, due to the origin of the expenses. This makes the debt situation in 
the EMU countries more severe, because it takes relatively more time to change it and 
reduce government obligations than in the 1920s. 
 
                                                
142 (European Commission, 2012a) 
France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
1990 10,6 9,7 9,9 3,9 10,1 4,9 7,9
1995 12,0 10,7 9,6 3,5 11,3 7,2 9,0
2000 11,8 11,2 10,7 3,1 13,6 7,9 8,6
2005 12,3 11,5 11,7 3,4 14,0 10,3 8,1
2007 12,5 10,7 11,9 3,6 14,1 10,8 8,0
PublicAExpenditureAonAPensionsAasAPercentageAofAGDP,AselectedAyearsA
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Loss of credit 
There was no international lender of last resort in the 1920s. In the early 1940s, there was an 
extended debate about how to establish an international credit institution to help countries 
finance short-term balance of payment deficits. This institution became the IMF.143  
During the 1920s the countries were very dependent on continuing borrowings from the US, 
and several countries were inn trouble when the US became more restrictive. The options 
they had were to deflate the economy, default on their debt or suspend the gold standard and 
devaluate their currency. They eventually turned to the last option.  
The EMU members on the other hand, received bailouts when their access to fresh debt 
narrowed and they could not pay their debts. The troika, consisting of the European 
Commission, the ECB and the IMF, have imposed strict financial conditions for countries to 
follow in order to receive the financial aid. The fact that the EMU countries have financial 
institutions that in some ways act as “lenders of last resort” makes the debt imbalance in the 
EMU countries a bit less dramatic compared with the gold standard countries.144  
But countries cannot rely too much on this source, as there is no federal fiscal system in 
place to secure these payments over longer periods of time. The indebted country can never 
be sure that they get the funds, and will have to follow the conditions set by the lenders in 
order to qualify for the money. It is also important that the market believe that the countries 
can be saved. If they do not, even this financial assistance might prove inadequate.  
 
Concluding remarks 
After this analysis I have found that there are very high debt levels in countries within both 
monetary unions. But there are more rigidity and difficulties with reducing the debt levels in 
the EMU than there were in the gold standard. This is due to the origin of the debt and future 
public obligations, especially when it comes to welfare costs and pensions.  
                                                
143 (Kindleberger & Aliber, 2011, p. 247) 
144 (Armitstead, 2012) 
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But the loss of credit was still more damaging during the gold standard as there was no 
international lender of last resort at that time. In the EMU crisis, countries have been able to 
borrow money from different financial institutions, but there have been strict requirements to 
cut costs and raise taxes in order to get them.  
 
6.4 Rigidity and fundamental changes  
Here I will look at the monetary systems´ ability to adapt to fundamental changes. Do the 
monetary unions enable countries to adjust their competitiveness without putting too much 
undue strain on economic activity in the adjustment process? Crucial for this discussion is 
the adjustment mechanisms for the monetary unions, explained in section 5.1.2 and 5.2.2 for 
the gold standard and the EMU respectively. The theory about flexibility and rigidity in 
section 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 is also important in the understanding of rigidity and fundamental 
changes.  
I will start the discussion by explaining the competitive situations in the monetary unions, 
and then look at factors that might decrease the flexibility level of wages and costs. Then, 
based on the theory in section 4.5.3, I will look at labour mobility and its possibility to make 
up for wage rigidity in the unions.   
The term natural rate of unemployment from section 4.8.1 is relevant for the discussion of 
unemployment in the following comparison.  
 
6.4.1 The gold standard 
The competitive situation 
Economic growth in the 1920s was hampered by highly deflationary policies in countries 
with overvalued currencies. This policy was aimed at reducing wages and prices to levels 
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that were compatible with the exchange rate.145 Yet contracts and conventions, among 
others, stood in the way of rapid downward adjustment of wages and prices.146 The 
downward rigidity of wages and costs impeded the adjustment to deflationary pressures. 
Countries shortage of gold then caused falling output and employment rather than falling 
wages and prices.147  
The consequence for the deficit countries was a high level of unemployment and loss of 
competitiveness in export markets. British costs stood well above those of her competitors in 
a fiercely competitive market. The sterling was overvalued, and in addition to that they had a 
relatively slow rate of productivity and technological growth. 148 
 
Decreased flexibility 
During the interwar period more labourers got the right to vote with the universal male 
suffrage. Parliamentary labour parties were founded and trade unionism increased. One of 
the conditions of the classical gold standard was severely weakened by this development.149 
The governments had to a larger extent take into account what the people wanted when 
deciding upon political monetary strategies. It was no longer as easy to choose exchange rate 
stability at the expense of other domestic targets as unemployment levels. The working class 
got a stronger position, and with this less flexible wages and working conditions followed.  
In the industrial countries, wages rose or fell on average only three-quarters as fast as 
wholesale prices between 1921 and 1927. So even if wholesale prices adjusted to neutralize 
the effects of exchange-rate changes, labour costs did not.150 When prices decreased while 
costs remained unchanged, producer profit decreased. Increased competitiveness might not 
                                                
145 (Boltho, 1996) 
146 (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, 1992, pp. 104-105) 
147 (Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital - A History of the International Monetary System, 1998, p. 45) 
148 (Moggridge, 1972, p. 124) 
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compensate for the lower profit, and some firms might have to shut down. This would 
increase unemployment.  
When prices increased, wages also tended to lag behind. The result was that the real earnings 
for the wage earner diminished in periods of increasing prices, causing falling demand.151 
From Figure 26 we can see the average annual real wage earnings in the period between 
1925 and 1929. The costs of production were reduced by the French inflation, reflecting the 
tendency of money wages to lag behind rising prices. Even three years after the stabilisation 
in 1926, there was still a gap between domestic and foreign labour costs.  
Figure 26: Indexed Average Annual Real Wage Earnings, 1925-1929 (1924 = 100) 
 
Source: (Phelps-Brown & Browne, 1968), Appendix 3  
The unemployment due to the downward rigidity of wages and costs created budgetary 
difficulties for governments, and this further undermined the confidence in the currency. 
This intensified the pressure on governments to react in ways that might jeopardize the 
monetary standard.152  
A high degree of wage flexibility was necessary in order to achieve domestic equilibrium, as 
mentioned in the theory section of the gold standard. As rigidity became stronger during the 
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interwar period, the governments were facing a difficult decision. They had to choose 
between external and domestic equilibrium, because without the flexibility it was very 
difficult to achieve both.  
 
Labour mobility 
Increased worker mobility might compensate for decreased wage rigidity and give credibility 
to fixed exchange rate systems, as explained in section 4.5.3. Then the unemployed work 
force could move to places where they were needed and countries would be able to reach 
equilibrium without increasing unemployment. But immigration laws in the New World 
during the 1920s regulated and restricted international labour movements.153 Hence, worker 
mobility could not compensate for decreased wage flexibility in the interwar period.  
 
6.4.2 The EMU 
The competitive situation 
The largest economy in the euro area, Germany, has portrayed a sharp fall in its relative unit 
labour cost and price level, which has increased German competitiveness. The reason for the 
sharp fall was that Germany still was coping with the unwinding of the reunification boom 
of the early 1990s when the euro was introduced. They had to shift back resources from the 
construction industry towards the tradable industries. This could only be done through 
further competitiveness gains and associated disinflation since the euro conversion rate was 
fixed. Germany turned the current account deficit from the boom into large surpluses. 
Between 1998 and 2007, the OECD states that Germany improved its overall 
competitiveness against all countries by more than 10 per cent.154 
According to the same source, Italy´s competitiveness worsened by 34 per cent at the same 
time. Italy and Portugal have portrayed higher inflation than the average, but rather sluggish 
                                                
153 (Eichengreen, Golden Fetters - The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919-1939, 1992, pp. 184-186) 
154 (Economic and Financial Affairs, 2008, p. 53) 
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average activity levels. They have also shown weak growth in labour and total factor 
productivity, which has contributed to the eroding of their cost competitiveness and external 
positions. 
Ireland, Greece and Spain have seen output growth and inflation persistently higher than the 
euro average. The relative unit labour cost has increased, as have their current account 
deficits.155 
In Figure 27 we see the development in competitiveness between some of the euro members. 
The nominal unit labour cost is significantly lower in Germany than for the other countries, 
as is the real effective exchange rate. Both figures indicate that Germany is relatively more 
competitive compared to the other countries.156  
Figure 27: Competitiveness of Selected Euro Area Countries, 1999 - 2009 
 
Source: (European Commission, 2010) 
 
                                                
155 (Economic and Financial Affairs, 2008, p. 53) 
156 (Favaro, Li, Pradelli, & Doorn, 2011, p. 227) 
       84 
Reduced flexibility 
Because the member countries no longer can be rectified by devaluations, shortcomings in 
economic policy now need to be corrected by painful longer-term adjustments157. For this 
process to take place without putting undue strain on economic activity, wages have to adjust 
rapidly to changes in labour market conditions. But high firing costs, generous 
unemployment benefits and strong unions with collective wage bargaining are perceived to 
have contributed to wage rigidity.158 This prolongs the adjustment process. If this adjustment 
is slow, it may gradually erode the competitiveness of domestic firms since they no longer 
can depreciate their nominal exchange rate. This increases the unemployment level. 159   
The adjustment channel in the EMU depends on increased efficiency and productivity in 
order to improve competitiveness. If wages are inflexible, it might be difficult to reduce 
costs following a negative shock. Continuing productivity gains, which will reduce the 
nominal wage, is therefore necessary in order to compensate for downward wage rigidity.  
Growth prospects for some of the southern countries are low, as mentioned in section 6.3.2, 
and this might be a difficult starting point for the task of increasing productivity.  
The increased competitiveness following the union might have made inflexibility in wages 
even more costly for EMU countries in terms of unemployment. Higher price transparency 
has increased the responsiveness of employment to real wages. In case of adverse shocks, 
rigid wages will now lead to higher unemployment than before the EMU.160  
Different structural changes in labour market institutions also cause divergent movements in 
competitiveness between the EMU members.161 The differences in wage increases between 
Germany and the rest of the Eurozone, explained in section 6.2.2, is an example of that.  
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Labour mobility 
The free movement of EU workers within the then European Common Market was the first 
of the four basic economic freedoms of the European market to be implemented in 1968162. 
But even though citizens of the Union has the right to work in another member state, not that 
many choose to do so. The labour market adjustment through geographic mobility is low in 
most euro area countries, both between member states and at the national level. This means 
that the adjustment in Europe largely is done through changes in activity and unemployment. 
Low mobility has also led to unemployment differentials that are large and persistent and 
hence of structural nature.163  
Some of the reasons for the failure of labour mobility to equalise structural unemployment 
reflects both policy related factors and other factors. One factor is that minimum wages are 
set at a single rate for all regions of a given member state. This prohibits wage adjustments 
to absorb differences in productivity across regions. Other barriers that may offset the 
incentive effects of wage differentials are restrictive employment protection legislations, 
housing market obstacles, lack of information about job opportunities in other regions, 
language barriers, lifestyle differences and limited geographic range for job search 
requirements without risking the loss of unemployment benefit entitlement.164  
 
6.4.3 Comparison of the gold standard and the EMU 
What to compare? 
Some factors are more fundamental and influence the long-run prices in a market, thereby 
influencing the exchange rate. The most direct fundamental factors include input costs, 
productivity levels, tastes and so on.165 I will look at Unit Labour Costs (ULC) in the 
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163 (Coppel, Serres, & Hoeller, 1999, p. 17) 
164 (Coppel, Serres, & Hoeller, 1999, p. 17) 
165 (Pigott, 1981) 
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monetary systems. Differences in the development in countries ULCs might indicate 
differences in fundamental factors between countries and lead to imbalances.   
If the systems are not able to correct for different changes in fundamental factors, this might 
lead to high and persistent levels of unemployment. Unemployment levels might therefore 
give an indication of the rigidity in the two monetary systems.  
It is argued that labour mobility might make up for inflexible wages and prices. I will 
therefore look at this factor as well to see if this might be the case in these two monetary 
unions.  
 
Unit wage/labor cost 
ULCs measure the average cost of labour per unit of output. It is calculated as the ratio of 
total labour costs to real output, and provide a link between productivity and the cost of 
labour in producing output. An increase in ULCs indicates that growth in average employee 
compensation exceeds growth in labour productivity. This might create pressure on producer 
prices.166 I assume here that Unit Wage Costs (UWC) is approximately the same 
measurement as ULC, as I do not have any more information about the measurement 
methods used for the gold standard members.  
Figure 28 displays the indexed UWC in the UK, Germany and the US between 1925 and 
1931. These data show that UK´s and Germany´s competitive position deteriorated 
compared with the US. Britain´s 1925 competitive disadvantage with Germany had 
disappeared by 1929 due to Germany´s relative increasing UWCs.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
166 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012c) 
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Figure 28: Unit Wage Cost in Industry, 1925 – 1931 (1925 = 100) 
 
Source: (Phelps-Brown & Browne, 1968), Appendix III.  
The thick line in Figure 29a and 29b is the average unit labour cost of 10 EU member states. 
In Figure 29a we can see that France, and to a lesser extent, Germany showed a sharp 
increase in ULCs until the late 1980s, but have a similar trend as the average after the euro 
was introduced in 1999. Germany had however a slightly lower increase than the average in 
the period after the euro introduction, partly due to its wage moderation explained in section 
6.2.2. 
Figure 29a:	  Trends in Unit Labour Costs 
Among ´non-Convergent´ Countries 
Figure 29b: Trends in Unit Labour Costs 
Among ´Convergent´ Countries
 
Source: (Lewney, 2011, p. 10) 
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From Figure 29b we see that Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy experienced a sharper 
increase in their ULCs than the average before the euro was introduced, but the cost level 
was still below average. After the euro introduction, when the implications for 
competitiveness represented by that trend could not be offset by depreciation anymore, the 
ULCs continued to increase more rapidly than the average.167  
Figures for both monetary systems indicate increasing imbalances in the ULCs between 
countries within the same monetary union. The countries with the highest UWCs/ULCs are 
also the countries that had the lowest gold reserves and balances of payments, explained in 
section 6.1.1 and 6.1.2. This indicates wage rigidity because these countries should have 
lower ULCs in order to be able to decrease price levels and become more competitive, 
according to the theories.  
 
Unemployment 
If the wages were inflexible during the gold standard, countries would experience 
unemployment above the natural level when adjusting back to external equilibrium. Also the 
adjustment in the EMU requires some unemployment in the transition phase as companies 
improve their competitiveness by increasing efficiency and productivity. Very high 
unemployment levels in different countries during the two periods might be an indication of 
too slow adjustment mechanisms.  
Figure 30 shows the unemployment level in the UK from 1925 to 1931, reaching almost 2,76 
million unemployed in 1931. At this point it becomes very difficult for the politicians to 
continue deflationary policies in order to defend the parity and the external equilibrium. This 
was also the point where Britain decided to leave the gold standard and focus more on the 
domestic equilibrium.  
 
 
                                                
167 (Lewney, 2011, p. 9) 
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Figure 30: Registered Unemployed in the UK, 1925 - 1931 
 
Source: (Eichengreen, Watson, & Grossman, Bank Rate Policy Under the Interwar Gold 
Standard, 1993) 
Table 6 lists unemployment in per cent of total labour force in UK, US and Germany. The 
level is increasing in all three countries, reaching very high levels from 1929 onwards.  The 
highest level found is Germany with 31,1 per cent unemployment. 
Table 6: Unemployment for Gold Standard Countries, 1920 – 1932 
 
Source: (Liesner, 1989) 
Unemployment*Rate,*Per*Cent*of*Total*Labour*Force*
UK US Germany
1920 1,9*% 5,2*% 3,8*%
1924 7,1*% 5,0*% 13,5*%
1926 8,6*% 1,8*% 18,0*%
1928 7,4*% 4,2*% 8,4*%
1930 11,1*% 8,7*% 15,3*%
1932 15,3*% 23,6*% 31,1*%
*Are*missing*corresponding*French*rates*
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The unemployment levels are also high in the EMU, and they differ between member 
countries. Table 7a lists the unemployment as per cent of total labour force, while Table 7b 
lists the unemployment level among young people between the ages of 15 to 29.  
Table 7a: Unemployment Rates for EMU Countries, 1999-2011 
 
Source: (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012d) 
 
Table 7b: Youth Unemployment Rates for EMU Countries, 1999 - 2011 
 
Source: 1999 – 2009: (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2012b), 
Year 2011 (European Commission, 2012b)  
Also here we can see that the unemployment level rises as the crisis becomes more severe, 
and the governments need to run deflationary fiscal policy in order to reduce the debt levels. 
Highest for the EMU countries is the unemployment level of 21,7 per cent in Spain. But 
most dramatic is probably the high youth unemployment levels found in several countries, 
ranging from 29,1 to 46,4 per cent for the PIIGS countries. The question is how long the 
governments will manage to run policies like this.  
France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
1999 10,4:% 8,6:% 12,0:% 5,7:% 10,9:% 5,0:% 13,3:%
2003 8,9:% 9,8:% 9,8:% 4,6:% 8,5:% 7,1:% 11,4:%
2005 9,3:% 11,3:% 9,9:% 4,4:% 7,7:% 8,6:% 9,2:%
2007 8,4:% 8,7:% 8,3:% 4,6:% 6,2:% 8,9:% 8,3:%
2009 9,5:% 7,8:% 9,5:% 11,9:% 7,8:% 10,6:% 18,0:%
2011 9,7:% 5,9:% 17,7:% 14,5:% 8,5:% 12,9:% 21,7:%
Unemployment:Rates,:Per:Cent:of:Total:Labour:Force:
France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
1999 26,5;% 8,6;% 31,7;% 9,8;% 31,1;% 8,8;% 28,3;%
2003 18,2;% 10,6;% 26,8;% 9,4;% 26,3;% 14,5;% 22,7;%
2005 20,3;% 15,2;% 26,0;% 9,7;% 24,0;% 16,1;% 19,7;%
2007 18,9;% 11,7;% 22,9;% 10,0;% 20,3;% 16,6;% 18,2;%
2009 22,8;% 11,0;% 25,8;% 25,9;% 25,4;% 20,0;% 37,9;%
2011 22,9;% 8,6;% 44,4;% 29,4;% 29,1;% 30,1;% 46,4;%
Young;Unemployment;Rates;(Age;15H29),;Per;Cent;of;Total;Labour;Force;
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If the wages and prices were more flexible, the adjustments back to more competitive 
economy would be faster and would generate less unemployment. There are large levels of 
unemployment both during the gold standard and in the EMU.  
 
Labour movements 
The general consensus is that immigration policy always has been sensitive to labour market 
condition, and that immigration itself always has been sensitive to wage and unemployment 
rate differentials between countries. Throughout the history it has been seen that during a 
time of economic recession and high unemployment level, there was a new push for 
immigration restrictions.168  
Figure 31: Immigration Policies in the US and UK, 1850 - 1930 
Source: (Timmer & Williams, 1998, p. 743) 
Figure 31 are trying to capture the intention, or political signals, of the political agents that 
were trying to affect the flow of immigrants in the period 1850 to 1930. Policies are scored 
from 5 to -5, ranging from “active worker recruitment abroad” to “closed doors, enforced”.  
These graphs show policy indexes in the US and the UK. It can be seen that immigration was 
generally unrestricted in the 1860s, but that the doors to the New World were effectively 
closed by 1930. The US index fell from 0 in the early 1860s to -5 by 1930, and it did not 
                                                
168 (Timmer & Williams, 1998, pp. 742-743) 
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have any major policy reversal over the period. UK on the other hand promoted immigration 
even though they were struggling with very high levels of unemployment at that time.169  
This shows that the countries at the gold standard did not have free labour movements in 
their monetary union, and therefore did not allow this to make up for inflexible wage levels. 
But as both countries had high unemployment levels, unrestricted labour movements would 
not necessary have made it any better at this time.  
The EU and EMU have on the other hand worked towards free trade and labour movement 
since the establishment of the EEC. They have an agreement between the countries on the 
issue of free labour mobility, while the gold standard countries imposed immigration tariffs 
during the crisis. But even if the opportunity is there, the mobility is not as high as one could 
have hoped for.  
Figure 32: Readiness of EU Workers to Move in Case of Unemployment 
 
Source: (Vandenbrande, et al., 2006) 
Figure 32 breaks down the readiness to move in case of unemployment by age and gender. 
Even though the results should be interpreted with caution, they show that one out of three 
                                                
169 (Timmer & Williams, 1998, pp. 771-744) 
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Europeans would not like to move even in the case of unemployment. Only 31 per cent 
would be ready to move, both to another region or another country within the EU.170  
Labour mobility is emphasised in the literature on optimal currency areas, but the mobility in 
either of the currency areas is clearly not as widespread as it should be. It seems clear that 
labour movements in the EMU cannot make up for the inflexible wages and prices, as was 
the case for the gold standard. Even though the EMU countries have made it possible to 
move across the country boarders, the labour force seems unwilling to do so, even when 
facing unemployment. Labour movement as a solution to reduce unemployment only seems 
like a realistic option for a relatively restricted number of persons in the EU.171 
 
Concluding remarks 
After looking at flexibility in wages and costs, it seems clear that wage rigidity is present in 
both monetary unions. This seems obvious from both the differences in countries 
UWCs/ULCs and very high unemployment levels indicating slow adjustment channels.  
The right to move freely within the EU makes the EMU one important step closer to a 
functional monetary union compared to the gold standard. Labour mobility was limited 
during the gold standard while it is promoted in the EMU. But as long as the labourers are 
unwilling to move for work, labour mobility cannot make up for the rigidities. 
 The fact that there are rigidities in the monetary systems makes them unable to handle 
changes in countries competitiveness as presented in the theoretical frameworks of the 
monetary unions.  
 
                                                
170 (Vandenbrande, et al., 2006) 
171 (Vandenbrande, et al., 2006) 
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6.5 Credibility of the monetary system 
First I will look at credibility and cooperation within each of the systems. Then I will look at 
contagious crisis that have arisen in the two periods. This is done in order to see how the 
lack of credibility affected individual parts of the monetary unions. The theory in section 
4.2.2 about speculators and other market participants is relevant as their bets and guesses 
might have huge impact on a fixed exchange rate system. Also the theory of different forms 
of risk, in section 4.9, is relevant as interest spreads might increase as credibility to the 
system falls.  
The last section is focused on the political aspect and the implications from the fact that the 
unions are not also political unions. 
The theoretical foundation in the comparison section is based on the theory about (n-1) and 
credibility in section 4.4 and the adjustment problem in section 4.5. The theory about 
monetary and political unions is found in section 4.7. 
 
6.5.1 The gold standard 
Credibility of the system and cooperation  
The pre-war system had been focused around London as its financial centre. The interwar 
system, on the other hand, was organized around two competing financial centres, namely 
London and New York. 172  
Nevin (1955) linked the international monetary system in the interwar period to an 
automobile and characterised Britain and the US as “two quite excellent drivers… 
perpetually fighting to gain control of the vehicle173”. The classical gold standard was said to 
work so well because of the role of the Bank of England and its Bank Rate.174  But the 
                                                
172 (Eichengreen, The Gold Standard in Theory and History, 1985, p. 21) 
173 (Nevin, 1955, p. 12) 
174 (Eichengreen, The Gold Standard in Theory and History, 1985, p. 16) 
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interwar system was influenced by the actions of two financial centres, and like a car with 
two drivers; the system would only function if those centres were capable of cooperating and 
acting consistently.175  
After 1928 the authorities grew less willing to coordinate intervention in response to 
imbalances in the external accounts or to engage in cooperative reflationary efforts. New 
York also became increasingly preoccupied by domestic factors in its interest formulations. 
Lack of cooperation decreased the credibility to the system. When the credibility of the 
government´s commitment to the maintenance of its gold standard peg was questionable, 
destabilising speculation often occurred. This increased the pressure on governments and 
made capital flow in destabilising directions. Where the credibility was greatest, capital still 
flowed in stabilising directions. 176  
 
The Central European banking crisis 
In the summer of 1931, instability spread to the system´s industrial core. In May 1931, there 
was a run on Austria´s leading bank, the Creditanstalt. Given the superficial similarity of the 
Austrian and German financial systems, investors concluded that this could likely happen in 
Germany as well. Austria and Germany suffered banking crises and runs on their 
international reserves. The more aid they extended to their banking systems, the faster the 
gold fled from their central banks. As capital fled and foreign credit became unavailable in 
Berlin, the German government was forced to respond with exchange controls and an 
agreement effectively freezing Germany´s international loans.  
Even financial aid from Britain did not prevent investors from withdrawing their money, and 
the bank went bankrupt in 1929. Britain´s weakened balance of payments was a result of 
losses on overseas investments caused by the Depression. The uncertainty about the 
condition of the British bank system prevented them from being a credible source of credit to 
                                                
175 (Eichengreen, International Policy Coordination in Historical Perspective: A View From the Interwar Years, 1984, p. 12) 
176 (Eichengreen, The Gold Standard in Theory and History, 1985, p. 21) 
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the hard-pressured bank. The Central European banking crisis further unsettled the British 
balance.177 
 
Not a political union 
The first efforts to restore the international gold standard took place at conferences in 
Brussels in 1920 and Genoa in 1922. Some countries saw this as an opportunity to erect a 
formal framework for systematic international monetary cooperation, but unfortunately they 
failed to provide this. The credibility of each government´s commitment to the gold standard 
was therefore subject to growing scrutiny.178  
The lack of a stronger framework around the monetary union made it possible for countries 
to break the rules of the game and act in destabilizing ways without facing any sanctions. 
The system was based on the belief that countries benefited from the gold standard, and 
therefore acted according to the rules of the game. But the exit from the gold standard was 
easy. Countries still had their national currency and could simply devaluate.  
 
6.5.2 The EMU 
Credibility of the system and cooperation 
There is a political economical aspect of the crisis in Europe. This aspect is influenced by the 
build-up of cross-border private and public debts, both from the external imbalances since 
1999 and from the large fiscal imbalances that emerged during the Financial Crisis.   
Three stakeholders play an active role in shaping the policy responses to the financial 
turmoil; debt holders, governments of the euro area debtor countries and governments of the 
stronger EU states, i.e. Germany and France.179 They have conflicting interests in some 
                                                
177 (Eichengreen, Globalizing Capital - A History of the International Monetary System, 1998, p. 49) 
178 (Eichengreen, International Policy Coordination in Historical Perspective: A View From the Interwar Years, 1984, p. 3) 
179 (Favaro, Li, Pradelli, & Doorn, 2011) 
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areas, and at several critical stages during the crises people have feared that stakeholders are 
too slow in deciding which actions to take. This can give loss of credibility to the system. 
 
The Sovereign Debt Crisis 
While banks and financial institutions borrow from the ECB, the national governments 
borrow money by issuing government bonds. The EMU brought to life an integrated market 
for fixed-income government securities in the euro area, and the bonds issued by member 
states was supposed to be close, but not perfect substitutes. Unfortunately, the market 
participants never regarded these bonds as close to perfect substitutes. There have been 
persistent interest rate differentials since 1999, and some have increased dramatically for 
since the Financial Crisis of 2008-09.180 This is a clear sign of lack of confidence in some 
countries.  
Figure 33 displays the sizeable and highly volatile yield spreads in long-term interest rates 
on government bonds for different member countries. Especially the Greek interest rate 
increased dramatically, starting in 2009.  
Figure 32: Long Term Interest Rates on Government Bonds, 1999- 2013 
 
Source: (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011b) 
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When investors start worrying that the debt of one country is too large and doubt the 
country´s ability to pay back capital and interests, they demand higher interest rates to 
subscribe new public debt. The higher interest rates serve as a compensation for the 
insolvency risk. The higher interest rates also increase the insolvency risk, which in turn 
further increases the interest rates. The fear in the market is then a risk to the solvency of a 
country, and in turn a risk for the whole EMU. It might drive the interest rates to the point 
where the country just has to stop subscribing the public debt. At this point default of the 
debt is the only option, as they do not have the option of inflating their way out. 181  
Contagion is also a product of fear and speculation in the market in this situation. Investors 
started to suspect that other countries with high levels of public debt, as Portugal, Spain and 
Italy, would find themselves in similar situations. Even if the situation was not as bad in 
these countries, fears that the willingness to raise taxes above a level considered “politically 
sustainable” might arise. This might push the interest rates to a level so high that the 
prophecy eventually will come true.182 
 
Not a political union 
It has been argued that the euro has been motivated by politics and not economics, even 
though the EMU is not a political union. A monetary union that is imposed under 
unfavourable conditions might become a barrier to political unity.183  
The tax sector in a normal country or currency area acts as an automatic stabiliser between 
different regions. If income increase in one region and decrease in another, the relatively 
wealthier region will contribute more to the federal budget than the poorer. Then the money 
is distributed to the rest of the country. EMU does not have such a centralized tax system, as 
it is not a political union. Some claim that this transfer mechanism is unnecessary because 
the financial market in theory can spread the risk. But the financial markets, as we have seen 
many times, can be unstable. They also provide few opportunities to spread the risk 
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183 (March, 2009, p. 200) 
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concerned with work income, which is the largest part of the income in most developed 
countries.184  
The political situation within member countries might also be a concerning factor as many 
political areas still are in the hands of the national governments. Government elections in 
both Greece and France have concerned many people because a new government might 
impede some of the cooperation among the top politicians in the EMU.185  
 
6.5.3 Comparison of the gold standard and the EMU 
What to compare? 
I will start with addressing the (n-1) problem with one degree of freedom.  Then I will look 
at the adjustment problem of a monetary union as a consequence of rigidity in wages and 
prices. These are theories of credibility in a monetary union.  
As political unions might reduce the risk of asymmetric shocks and the costs of a monetary 
union at any level, political integration might increase the credibility of a monetary union. 
The comparison of political integration between countries is divided into institutional and 
functional levels, explained in the theory.   
 
(n-1) problem 
The (n-1) problem explains that there will be one degree of freedom in a monetary union 
with fixed exchange rates, implicating that one country might set its monetary policy 
independent from the others. This degree of freedom can be used to pursue some joint 
objective of the union, but might also become a source of conflict.  
During the gold standard there were one degree of freedom in the monetary cooperation. 
Before the WWI Britain was the leading country, but lost this role in the interwar period. If 
                                                
184 (Rogoff, 2012) 
185 (Dagens Næringsliv, 2012) 
       100 
the member countries under the gold standard had managed to agree upon one joint objective 
for the monetary union, this would not necessarily be a big problem. But unfortunately the 
US was too preoccupied with its domestic situation, and did not set the exchange rate and 
interest rates as would have benefited many of the other countries in the union. These actions 
contributed to some of the instabilities that caused the collapse of the union.  
The interest rate in the EMU is set on the average economical level among the member 
states. The independent ECB decides the interest rate and makes the monetary policy 
decisions, as opposed to one individual country. There is therefore not the same (n-1) 
problem as it was during the gold standard. The EMU members have also agreed upon a 
joint objective for the union, namely price stabilisation. This have removed the source of 
conflict that the degree of freedom otherwise could have become.    
The EMU is a stronger monetary union than the gold standard was when it comes to 
cooperation because of its independent financial institutions. Since the ECB set the interest 
rate independently, the (n-1) problem is reduced in the EMU. This increases credibility.  
 
Adjustment problem 
The adjustment problem says that if there is wage and price rigidity, the fixed exchange 
commitment is only credible if it is assured that the governments give no weight at all to 
unemployment. Wage and price inflexibility have been present in both monetary unions, as 
explained in section 6.4. Countries within both monetary systems have also experienced very 
high levels of unemployment in times of economic downturns. Then the adjustment problem 
might be a source leading to reduced credibility in both monetary unions.  
As already mentioned, one of the most significant developments of the interwar period was 
the growing importance of domestic factors as the final determinant of monetary policies186. 
Combined with very high levels of unemployment, seen in Table 6, this was a difficult 
situation for the policy makers in the countries at the gold standard. The high unemployment 
level in the UK in 1931 was surely a contributor to Britain´s demise of the gold standard, 
proving that the government also gave weight to the unemployment level. The country 
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devaluated its currency, and was thereby off the gold standard and was able to pursue 
domestic targets as reducing unemployment levels. Even if being on the gold standard 
signalled financial control, and therefore secured access to international financial markets, 
they still had their own national currency to fall back on, so the consequences of breaking 
out were not that radical. I therefore assume that the adjustment problem was present in the 
gold standard.  
The unemployment levels are very high in some of the EMU member countries today, 
especially in the PIIGS countries, seen from Table 7a and 7b. Countries have been forced to 
cut costs in order to reduce their debt levels, which further increases unemployment. As 
noted during the section about possible ways out of the union, it is not as easy to devaluate 
out from the EMU as it was during the gold standard. If a country does break out it will need 
to re-establish its old currency or a new one, and the consequences of a break out are 
predicted to be severe. Also, the choice to leave the union might not decrease unemployment 
after all. An out-breaker country would most likely have trouble borrowing money in the 
financial market and would have to make even harder cuts in government costs. This might 
reduce the adjustment problem, because the option to break is not necessarily so tempting for 
individual countries.  
Because of the relative difficulty of breaking out of today´s monetary union in Europe 
compared to the gold standard, I assume that the adjustment problem is slightly less 
prevailing within the EMU than it was during the gold standard.  
 
Political union 
Rule-based regimes cannot by themselves create credibility. It must not only be strongly 
backed by macroeconomic and structural policies, but it also by strong political will. Since 
the EMU and the gold standard are not political unions, trust might be particularly fragile.187 
The gold standard was not at all integrated on the institutional level. Countries relied only on 
that the central banks of independent member states would act accordingly to the rules of the 
games, having no sanction opportunities on countries breaking these rules.  
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The EU has on the other hand developed a whole set of institutions to which the member 
states have delegated part of their national sovereignty. They have a legislative branch 
consisting of the European Parliament and the Council, and an executive branch consisting 
of the Commission and the Council. They also have a judicial branch, the Court of Justice. 
The EU has most of the institutions of a modern democracy, capable of taking decisions that 
have a direct impact at the national level.188  
Gold standard countries did not have any political integration at the functional level either, 
while the countries in the EMU have made significant transfers of sovereignty in areas as 
agriculture, monetary policy, competition policy and external trade policy. But in other areas 
as taxation, social security and wage policies, the member states have maintained close to the 
whole sovereignty.189 
EMU is clearly a more politically integrated monetary union than the gold standard was. 
Especially at the institutional level they have come far, but at the functional level they have 
refused to integrate some important economical areas. This has made it possible that 
Germany have maintained a significantly lower wage growth than other member states and 
that some countries have large debts partly due to too high welfare systems compared to 
their national tax income, causing political asymmetric shocks. The cooperation also relies 
on the electors continuing to elect euro friendly political parties willing to impose necessary 
reforms in order to avoid crisis.  
During the gold standard, even British financial aid to the Creditanstalt did not prevent the 
bank to failure. Some have also accused the politicians of the EMU to agree upon policy 
actions to slowly. This has caused fear in the markets and speculations about the presence of 
political will to pay for bailout packages. This has made it even more difficult to bring the 
interest spreads on government bonds down in the EMU.  
Figure 5 in section 4.7 shows that a monetary union benefits from becoming a political union 
because it will increase the degree of symmetry and flexibility. But it might be a very 
difficult task to increase the political level as many countries oppose giving up more of their 
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sovereignty than they already have. But the monetary systems might receive more credibility 
from the market the more politically integrated it is, and this is surely needed.  
 
Concluding remarks 
Following this analysis I found lack of credibility in both monetary unions. The (n-1) 
problem is however reduced in the EMU as they have agreed upon one political goal and the 
independent ECB is responsible for the one degree of freedom. The adjustment problem is 
also less severe in the EMU than in the gold standard due to higher breakout barriers. The 
fact that the EMU members have several common financial and political institutions also 
make them one step closer to a political union than they were in the gold standard.  
But large political difficulties within some countries and the fact that some important 
political decisions still remain on national level have created, and might further create, large 
political problems within the EMU. The market is an important agent, and there seems to be 
lack of confidence from the market in both monetary unions.  
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7. Conclusion 
 “Which political and economical factors were important contributors to the breakdown of 
the gold standard in the 1930s? Are any of these factors present in the European Monetary 
Union today, and if so, is it likely that they will contribute to similar lasting instabilities and 
a possible breakdown of the euro in the future?” 
 
The factors 
The factors seen as being important for the breakdown of the gold standard in this 
assignment were (1) the central bank´s interest rate policy and the rules of the game, (2) 
imbalances in exchange rates and (3) debt levels, (4) the systems ability to handle 
fundamental changes, and the (5) credibility of the monetary union.   
The comparison of these factors with the EMU found that similar problems and instabilities 
are present also within the EMU.  
The rules of the game were not followed as they should during the interwar gold standard, 
and since the EMU countries have given up their national interest rates they cannot be 
followed in the same manner in the EMU. But the ECB interest rate has imposed 
deflationary effects on deficit countries to a larger degree than on the surplus country 
Germany. The fact that deficit countries are unable to use their interest rates to attract capital 
from abroad might be a weakness of the EMU system, leading to lasting instabilities 
between countries.  
As in the gold standard, there are also imbalances in the exchange rates in the EMU, and this 
has influenced net trade negatively for weak countries. Germany has also increased the 
instability by maintaining more wage moderation than the other countries, imposing similar 
consequences as the acts of the US during the interwar gold standard. But the EMU has 
integrated free trade in the monetary union. This reduces the severity of this factor relative to 
the gold standard, where some countries raised trade barriers in difficult times.  
The debt imbalances are severe in the EMU, and the rigidity of some of the member 
countries public costs makes the situation politically and economically difficult. Financial 
institutions giving financial assistance have however prevented countries defaulting on their 
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debt. The loss of credit has therefore been less damaging this far in the EMU than it was in 
the interwar period. Still, countries do not know how long these payments will continue, and 
questions about the politicians will to bail out these countries have been raised several times 
during the crisis.   
Rigidity is also present in the EMU, as it was in the gold standard, and has made it difficult 
for the systems to handle changes in fundamental factors. The high unemployment levels in 
some countries have triggered the difficult political choice between domestic and external 
equilibrium, as it did in the interwar period. The free labour mobility within the EMU could 
have made up for some of the rigidities, but people seem too unwilling to move in order to 
let this happen. 
Investors in the market have also reacted with a lack of credibility to the systems and acted 
in destabilising ways. There are sources of credibility problems within both systems, but 
removed degree of freedom and large implications of breaking out from the EMU makes 
these problems less prevailing in the EMU than they were in the gold standard. But the lack 
of political will is still a large problem within the EMU.  
 
Tried but failed? 
The factors that led to the breakdown of the gold standard are also present in the EMU. 
Some important steps toward removing these factors have however been implemented in the 
EMU. The EMU has integrated free trade and labour movements, a common central bank 
and interest rate, made it more difficult to break out and agreed upon price stability as a goal, 
among other things, in order to remove the implications of these factors. Unfortunately it 
looks like it is inadequate. Even if many monetary decisions are centralised, there are still 
important decisions left on national level. Workers are not as willing to move, and wages do 
not adjust as fast as thought. The factors that led to the breakdown of the gold standard are 
therefore likely causes of instabilities in the EMU in the future.  
 
       106 
The future of the EMU 
It is difficult to predict whether these factors will lead to a breakdown of the EMU in the 
future or not, but something has to be done in order to remove the instabilities between 
countries. Much depends on the political will within the union.  
One of the things that are mentioned in several sections in the discussion part is political 
integration and the problems due to the fact that some economical areas on the functional 
level have remained in the hands of national governments. It seems like the political area is 
where the most dramatic changes needs to be implemented. A more integrated tax sector 
could act as an automatic stabiliser between different regions, and could contribute in 
securing long term capital flows between countries. This could also provide a higher degree 
of credibility in the market, which could reduce the interest spreads for the more indebted 
countries.  
More political integration of the EMU is however a large step for the monetary union that 
started up with an initial objective to reduce trade barriers. There are many challenges to 
overcome and political opponents to persuade on the path to become a more robust monetary 
and political union.  
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